{"id":18839,"date":"2015-03-06T12:30:33","date_gmt":"2015-03-06T01:30:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=18839"},"modified":"2015-03-06T15:15:51","modified_gmt":"2015-03-06T04:15:51","slug":"what-might-americas-new-long-range-strike-bomber-cost-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-might-americas-new-long-range-strike-bomber-cost-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"What might America’s new long range strike\u2013bomber cost? (part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"
In my previous post<\/a> on the US Long Range Strike\u2013Bomber (LRS-B), I promised to return to the likely cost-effectiveness of the future system. But first I’m going to back-track to examine the possible costs in a bit more detail. We’ll get around to cost-effectiveness in part three.<\/p>\n I noted that the USAF was estimating that it can build 100 LRS-Bs for the same cost as the 21 B-2s it acquired in the 1980s and 1990s. The finance industry is required to say that ‘past performance is not a reliable indicator of future returns’. Sadly, that isn’t true of Pentagon weapon system programs. Back in the early days of The Strategist<\/em> I showed how Augustine’s laws of defence acquisition could be used to accurately cost the new Ford<\/em>-class aircraft carriers<\/a>, despite previous optimistic projections.<\/p>\n Now I’m going to change my tune and state that Augustine’s laws won’t<\/em> work for the LRS-B. But first let’s note that they’ve done pretty well so far on predicting US bomber costs and the long-term trend is a well-established one. The graph below shows the cost of American bombers from 1929 to 1985, plotted in then-year dollars. (If we adjust for inflation, the graph flattens a little, but the growth is always well above inflation, at times as much as 10% per year, equivalent to a doubling of unit cost every seven years.) And Augustine’s data set includes some medium bombers. If we include only ‘heavy’ bombers (another relative term), the trend is stronger still.<\/p>\n Had we used Augustine’s growth law in 1990 to predict the cost of the B-2, we would’ve got the apparently stupid answer that each aircraft would cost $4 billion (all costs in US$) when delivered in 2000. Of course that turned out to be an overestimate\u2014but not by as much as would’ve seemed likely at the time! Each B-2 cost $800 million flyaway off the production line, but the extraordinary R&D costs saw each of the delivered aircraft cost the American taxpayer $2.6 billion in total (program cost)\u2014a totally unsustainable amount. I’ve plotted those costs on the graph, and the program cost isn’t far off the historic trend line.<\/p>\n