{"id":18903,"date":"2015-03-11T10:00:51","date_gmt":"2015-03-10T23:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=18903"},"modified":"2015-03-12T07:21:33","modified_gmt":"2015-03-11T20:21:33","slug":"nuclear-latency-and-the-future-strategic-environment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/nuclear-latency-and-the-future-strategic-environment\/","title":{"rendered":"Nuclear latency and the future strategic environment"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Broken<\/a><\/figure>\n

Since the 1946 \u2018Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy\u2019 and the closely associated Baruch Plan formulated by the United States, \u2018nuclear latency\u2019\u2014put simply, the potential for countries to obtain nuclear weapons capability\u2014has been a factor threatening to undermine strategic equilibrium on the world stage. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and resulting nonproliferation regime may have allayed mid-20th century concerns about the rate of spread of nuclear weapons, but the notion of nuclear latency has by no means become obsolete. At the same time, due to the complexity of underlying issues, the term continues to be widely misinterpreted and misjudged.<\/p>\n

From a technology standpoint, the question of nuclear latency is complicated by the inherent duality of nuclear expertise\u2014suitable both for nuclear weapons and for use in civil nuclear power programs. Accumulating a high level of nuclear capability under the guise of legitimate civilian programs may enable countries to maintain significant weaponisable knowledge without attracting a harsh backlash from the international community for having actually crossed the line. Therefore, from a political and analytical standpoint understanding a country\u2019s motivations is critical. Arms control negotiators, the global analytical community and international nuclear watchdog agencies need a meaningful definition of nuclear latency that takes account of both capability and intent in order to develop a common understanding of the issue and deal with it effectively.<\/p>\n

The list of 44 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Annex\u00a02 states, minus the number of recognised, de\u00a0facto and assumed nuclear-weapon states, could be a reasonable shorthand roster of nuclear latency candidates. The possession of indigenous capabilities to run both open and closed nuclear fuel cycles successfully is the ultimate indicator of nuclear latency. With such experience, a country harbouring an entrenched sense of existential insecurity, having a history of clashes with its neighbours and seeking to gain more regional dominance and international prestige could make a decision to weaponise. Nuclear watchdogs and other entities, including intelligence services, must remain vigilant.<\/p>\n

To explore the phenomenon in some detail, an ASPI paper published today<\/a> examines the cases of the Republic of Korea and Japan. Latent nuclear technology alone doesn\u2019t result in nuclear proliferation\u2014proliferation-related motivations, choices and decisions are required as well. Therefore, one useful way to analyse a country\u2019s proliferation decisionmaking is through the lens of \u2018technical capability +\u00a0intent\u2019. Prospectively, the main risk factor with the two Asian countries is their loss of confidence in the availability of a US nuclear umbrella. In contrast to the focus on indigenous nuclear programs in those nations, turn-key nuke acquisition may be more attractive to some countries in the Middle East. The nonproliferation community and intelligence services around the world will have to continue keeping an eye on the region\u2019s geopolitics.<\/p>\n

Australia should continue supporting the global nonproliferation agenda in any way it can. Here are four key recommendations:<\/p>\n