(Source: author’s analysis of data from ANAO and DMO)<\/p>\n
The situation’s actually starker than those figures suggest. The MOTS average is made to look worse by delays in the introduction of a new heavyweight torpedo for the Collins class submarines. But that’s caused mostly by delays in establishing the full cycle docking program for the boats, rather than problems with the weapons. If we exclude that, the average MOTS schedule overrun is less than 3%. And the developmental project average is made to look better than it is by the ANAO’s (usually sensible) practice of taking second pass approval as the starting point. By that measure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is projected to be 2% ahead<\/em> of schedule. But given that we’re already three years past the original planned in-service date and still five years from the initial operating capability, that seems a tad generous in this case.<\/p>\n
In other places the auditors have presented a picture that’s formally accurate, but which has the potential to mislead. For example, the aggregated data on real cost variations\u2014a useful measure of project performance\u2014isn’t especially helpful. Ninety-six percent of the quoted total of $11 billion is the cost of the 58 additional F-35 aircraft approved last year. In DMO-speak that might’ve been a formal change of scope to the project, but it was always intended to happen.<\/p>\n