{"id":19008,"date":"2015-03-13T11:00:49","date_gmt":"2015-03-13T00:00:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=19008"},"modified":"2015-03-16T10:05:50","modified_gmt":"2015-03-15T23:05:50","slug":"armys-future-role-moving-the-debate-further-forward","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/armys-future-role-moving-the-debate-further-forward\/","title":{"rendered":"Army\u2019s future role\u2014moving the debate further forward"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n In a recent blog post Mitchell Yates<\/a> made a useful contribution to the land forces debate in Australia. But\u2014again\u2014when we attempt to define what the Australian Army\u2019s role may or may not be we fall into the trap of retelling an old story and then drawing conclusions which are of questionable policy or force structure value.<\/p>\n Mitchell\u2019s argument makes a connection between the current Chief of Army\u2019s comment regarding Army reform\u2014\u2018reform is about ensuring the service remains \u201crobust and relevant into the future\u201d\u2019\u2014and the unknowable future of warfare. As Mitchell observes, \u2018Who knows what shape land warfare will take in the future, but must the Army be \u201crobust\u201d enough to confront any <\/em>hypothetical future conflict?\u2019 Without wanting to put words in David Morrison\u2019s mouth, I doubt Mitchell\u2019s conclusion is what he had in mind.<\/p>\n In an earlier blog post<\/a> I argued that:<\/p>\n Australia\u2019s policymakers\u2019 task is made more interesting because of (our) location; the size of (our) land mass, population and economy; and\u2014of increasing importance\u2014the perception held by others of Australia\u2019s role both regionally and globally. Together those factors create a unique set of policy challenges. The input element is also made more complex because governments, notwithstanding their occasional fiery rhetoric, seem to dislike restricting the capability or output options available to future governments. Force structure decisions are critical\u2014get them wrong and the options open to governments in the future close down quickly. That was the real issue for governments in the 90s: they had no options. That\u2019s why\u00a0balance<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>becomes so important.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n As a start point to any discussion about the Australian Army\u2019s role, one needs to be clear about how governments see Australia\u2019s place in the world, and what role we might\u2014or might wish to\u2014play in the future. Good or bad, right or wrong, since federation Australian governments have taken a global view and as such have sought to participate in global and regional events in ways that see the Australian Army as one possible part of an Australian response.<\/p>\n This continuity of national vision is important. It\u2019s not just a lens through which we look at ourselves as a nation, but also a lens through which force structure decisions are made.<\/p>\n Again (as I said<\/a> recently) this is not about low-intensity or high-intensity operations. It\u2019s about designing an Army force structure and skill set which offers government the best and broadest set of policy options to enable them to meet our national needs. Put simply, it\u2018s about balance; and that\u2019s no different for Army than it is for the other services.<\/p>\n Patrolling, ambushing and minor infantry tactics are the cornerstone of the skills which enable the Army to respond to the government\u2019s needs. It\u2019s around those universal skills that the Army is equipped to survive and has the means to impose its will on an adversary. Issues of affordability and sustainability lie at the heart of the notion of \u2018balance\u2019. Experience suggests the force structure to achieve that balance and breadth of options is based around three brigades, logistics and service support and a strong Special Forces component.\u00a0 We can argue about the size and mix but I\u2019d describe this as the \u2018core\u2019 force which, given economic conditions, can be tightened or expanded. When well equipped, history would suggest that it offers government the range of necessary options to meet our nation\u2019s responsibilities over time.<\/p>\n In this regard the key lesson from the 1930s and again from the \u201880s and \u201890s is that hollow force structures place both soldiers and national security at risk.\u00a0 Limiting Army\u2019s role to low-intensity operations and the \u2018light\u2019 forces typically associated with such missions simply limits options for future governments and puts at risk the lives of Australians when we eventually deploy them on missions and into circumstances they\u2019re ill-equipped to be in.<\/p>\n