{"id":19708,"date":"2015-04-14T09:25:56","date_gmt":"2015-04-13T23:25:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=19708"},"modified":"2015-04-14T09:26:13","modified_gmt":"2015-04-13T23:26:13","slug":"iran-cutting-a-deal-with-the-great-satan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/iran-cutting-a-deal-with-the-great-satan\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran: cutting a deal with the Great Satan"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>In 2003, a \u2018perfect storm\u2019 of intersecting developments saw Tehran caught with one hand in the nuclear weapon cookie jar (secretly enriching uranium), despite having joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and given assurances that it would do no such thing. The Iranian regime was humiliated.<\/p>\n India and Pakistan had endured sustained condemnation when they declared their nuclear-armed status via a blizzard of tests in 1998, but they were known proliferation risks and had declined to join the NPT. Even the DPRK\u2014not a state that anyone wants to be compared to\u2014had gone through the formality of withdrawing from the NPT in April 2003, to (redundantly) signal its intent to pursue a nuclear weapon capability.<\/p>\n Iran opted to bluff its way through. Tehran steadfastly denied that it had an obligation to restore confidence in its compliance with the NPT. It insisted that everything the IAEA could discover was consistent with its intention to build a substantial network of nuclear power stations. It maintained that it was also exercising its rights under the NPT to acquire its own capacities to fuel its future reactors with enriched uranium and (potentially) plutonium. For its part, the US insisted that Iran had to get out of the enrichment business.<\/p>\n Twelve years later, on 2 April 2015, negotiators from China, France, Germany, Russian, America and Iran announced agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning special arrangements to bolster confidence that Iran\u2019s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in intent and that it has no aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons. The JCPOA\u2014details of which can be found here<\/a>\u2014is commendably comprehensive, addressing both the enriched uranium and plutonium paths to the fissile core of a nuclear weapon.<\/p>\n Enrichment capacity will be cut by two-thirds and technological development precluded for 10 years; stocks of low-enriched uranium are set to be reduced to token levels for 15 years; the IAEA will have enhanced visibility of and access to Iranian nuclear facilities to verify compliance with the new agreement.<\/p>\n The central bargain may well have been Iran\u2019s acceptance of the need for \u2018special arrangements\u2019 with the US conceding retention of an enrichment capacity, albeit on that\u2019s circumscribed. If one looks at the key players, the regional context over recent decades and the broader global developments on the nuclear weapon front, easily the most surprising thing about this agreement is that it happened at all.<\/p>\n