New START<\/a> agreement, for example, one of the principal constraints falls on nuclear warheads deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The agreement says nothing about non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads, nothing about non-strategic warheads\u2014whether deployed or not. The same rule about close reading applies to the Iranian agreement. The interim agreement shows an attempt to constrain Iran\u2019s pathways to the development of fissile materials\u2014whether by uranium enrichment or by plutonium production. So far, the broad parameters are promising, but the devil will be in the details still to be agreed. As the interim agreement itself notes, nothing is agreed until all is agreed.<\/p>\nThird, the agreement enshrines a new metric for arms control: a proliferation breakout timeline. That timeline\u2014the time it would take Iran to acquire the fissile material for one nuclear weapon\u2014is meant to be kept at one year for the next ten years. The metric\u2019s essentially a by-product of the other technical constraints, but it does set a precedent that other future proliferators might be content to see applied to their own cases. The one-year timeline suggests that any breakout can be addressed by the international community, or at least its principal players, over that timeframe. The ten-year timeframe is not an exemption from Iran\u2019s obligations under the NPT, but some worry that it implies an absorptive capacity within the international community in relation to a future nuclear-armed Iran.<\/p>\n
Fourth, if this is an arms control measure and not a disarmament one, we should expect a degree of controversy about the agreement and its contents. One rule of arms control is that it\u2019s most available when least needed. Since some constraints on the Iranian nuclear program are sorely needed, that in itself suggests concluding a final agreement won\u2019t be simple. Arms control makes a virtue of half a loaf when the full loaf isn\u2019t available. In the context of negotiations between two heavily nuclear-armed superpowers, half a loaf\u2019s a good outcome. The virtue of half a loaf is going to be harder to sell in the context of proliferating powers. Treating nuclear proliferation as a management issue is more contentious.<\/p>\n
Finally, US policy has long tended to treat each specific proliferation problem as unique. After all, nuclear proliferation comes along infrequently enough that there\u2019s good reason to shape a response that addresses individual motivations. But that approach turns upon a broad acceptance across the US mainstream about the nature of the potential proliferator. I think we\u2019re about to see, over coming months, whether such a level of agreement exists in relation to Iran.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Since the early April release of the Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program, commentators have been vocal and divided about its merits and demerits. I\u2019m …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":19731,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[247,935,423,31],"class_list":["post-19730","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-iran","tag-nuclear-policy","tag-nuclear-strategy","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Reflections on the nuclear deal with Iran | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n