{"id":19737,"date":"2015-04-15T06:00:20","date_gmt":"2015-04-14T20:00:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=19737"},"modified":"2015-04-14T22:22:47","modified_gmt":"2015-04-14T12:22:47","slug":"first-principles-review-a-plan-to-stick-to","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/first-principles-review-a-plan-to-stick-to\/","title":{"rendered":"First Principles Review: a plan to stick to"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>Below a welter of clich\u00e9 and bamboozling modern management mumbo jumbo in the First Principles Review of Defence, there lurks much sound advice.<\/p>\n

The government has bought it all except for an unconvincing recommendation about the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. It\u2019s a good start.<\/p>\n

Peever\u2019s effort stands out from most of the external reviews of Defence over the last 15-odd years, some of which have likely made things worse. It\u2019s not necessary to name names\u2014the culprits are well known.<\/p>\n

In significant parts, however, the Peever analysis isn\u2019t as sound as its recommendations. For example, the report wonders why Defence \u2018has been unable to reform itself,\u2019 and suggests it may be due to increased operational tempo, budget uncertainty and high turnover of top leaders, including ministers. Those are more excuses than reasons\u2014such things usually stimulate change rather than suppress it.<\/p>\n

So if Defence \u2018has been unable to reform itself\u2019 in more recent years, why?<\/p>\n

First, \u2018reform\u2019 has been largely outsourced to dozens of reviews, the dubious recommendations of which have piled on top of one another. This can make for confusing and distracted managers that could be excused for being less concerned about improvement when they can expect that external reviewers will be asked to do their job for them. Peever\u2019s right to ask for a halt on external reviews that overlap with what he covers in his.<\/p>\n

Second, too many people at senior levels with narrow divisions of responsibility and the associated additional requirements to consult have coagulated management and restricted possibilities for action.<\/p>\n

Third, \u2018reform\u2019 needs to be pushed from the leaders at the top\u2014that is, the defence ministers. With one exception: defence ministers since Robert Ray have been undistinguished. Few have taken a strong interest in the proper workings of the organisation. Indeed, a number have succumbed to the insidious notion that they are \u2018customers\u2019 of Defence. They aren\u2019t, but when they pretend to be, management stasis is usually just around the corner.<\/p>\n

The success of the Peever review will depend largely on the defence ministers getting behind it and not just getting reports from an \u2018external Oversight Board\u2019, as recommended by the review and composed of its members. That isn\u2019t a good idea. Beware of reviewers urging their continued engagement. The Minister should be directing the operation and trusting the Secretary and the CDF to get on with it without an \u2018Oversight Board\u2019 looking over their shoulders. Peever reckons, rightly, that there are too many layers in Defence, yet he\u2019s recommended the creation of a new one.<\/p>\n

Of the many good things in the Peever Review, the following stand out:<\/p>\n