{"id":19770,"date":"2015-04-17T06:00:51","date_gmt":"2015-04-16T20:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=19770"},"modified":"2015-04-16T15:59:53","modified_gmt":"2015-04-16T05:59:53","slug":"the-demise-of-the-defence-materiel-organisation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-demise-of-the-defence-materiel-organisation\/","title":{"rendered":"The demise of the Defence Materiel Organisation"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Following the recommendations of the First Principles Review<\/a>, the government has agreed to move the quasi-independent Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) back into Defence. In its place will rise the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment (CAS) group\u2014effectively a pared down version of DMO with its top layer of management removed, but with substantial extra responsibilities in logistics and capability development.<\/p>\n The report\u2019s language is interesting; the DMO is to be \u2018disbanded\u2019, which sounds like what you\u2019d do with an outlaw motorcycle gang. That might not be accidental\u2014DMO has made more than a few enemies over the years.<\/p>\n In 2003, the Kinnaird Review of defence procurement then recommended the establishment of a fully independent \u2018executive agency\u2019 to undertake acquisition and sustainment. The goals of the proposed separation from Defence were four-fold:<\/p>\n Executive agency status was judged to be a step too far and, following push-back from Defence, the DMO was established as a financially-independent \u2018prescribed agency\u2019 in 2005. As a result, DMO was neither fully independent of Defence nor fully part of it. Nonetheless, the four goals were retained.<\/p>\n A decade later, here\u2019s what the First Principles Review had to say about DMO:<\/p>\n \u2018The Defence Materiel Organisation has also been beset with problems that have impacted its ability to achieve the required outcomes. It is clear that the organisation has become top heavy, complex and unnecessarily deep. This significantly contributes to Defence not getting the capability it needs at a reasonable cost or in reasonable time.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n So what went wrong? One way to try to answer the question is to examine the progress towards the four goals from 2003.<\/p>\n There\u2019s no doubt that the creation of DMO catalysed a more business-like relationship between the three Services and DMO. What\u2019s more, DMO has been able to work with the Services and defence industry to drive efficiencies. However, at the same time, tensions emerged between DMO and Defence over finance. The issues are arcane, but because DMO and Defence each have their own financial accounts what\u2019s best for one is not always best for the other.<\/p>\n Progress towards more flexible remuneration has been limited. Although the first Chief Executive Officer was employed on a salary exceeding that of either the Secretary or CDF, things slowed down pretty quickly after that. The problem was not that the Public Service Act<\/em> provided insufficient flexibility, but rather that Defence wasn\u2019t about to let DMO poach its staff and drive up its salaries. Frustrated, DMO did the only thing it could to get around the roadblock; a new layer of deputy secretary managers was born. Even then, the ability to attract the best talent from the private sector remained incomplete.<\/p>\n In terms of building a greater commercial focus, we\u2019re confronted with conflicting data. There\u2019s no denying that DMO has done a lot to professionalise and upskill its workforce. In addition, progress was made in establishing performance-based contracts, especially after the introduction of \u2018smart sustainment\u2019 in 2009. On the acquisition side, DMO was certainly a more formidable counterpart when it came to dealing with industry than its predecessors. And notwithstanding claims to the contrary, DMO has been very effective in delivering project within budget (though schedule remains a work in progress). Nonetheless, the First Principles Review believes that much more can be done via a \u2018smart buyer\u2019 approach with the private sector playing a greater role in managing both acquisition and sustainment.<\/p>\n Finally, if there was tension between DMO and Defence over financial matters, it was nothing compared with the rancour over whether DMO should provide independent risk assessments to cabinet submissions dealing with major projects. And there were other turf wars, such as the tussle over whether DMO\u2019s financial workforce should be absorbed into Defence \u2018shared service\u2019 regime.<\/p>\n Would things have turned out better if DMO had become a fully independent executive agency as recommended by Kinnaird in 2003 and again by the Mortimer Review in 2008? Who\u2019s to know? Greater separation may have prevented the squabbles over finance, staffing and advice to government, but it may have also introduced a different set of problems.<\/p>\n In the end, DMO had few friends. Sooner or later, something was going be done to reduce its power and independence. We can only hope that the pendulum has not swung too far back.<\/p>\n No doubt champagne corks are popping in the executive suites of defence industry as they look forward to dealing with a weakened contractual counterparty. But it must be a bittersweet victory for the folks over at Defence who will now have to take responsibility for the things that used to be blamed on DMO. Sometimes you\u2019ve got be careful what you wish for.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Following the recommendations of the First Principles Review, the government has agreed to move the quasi-independent Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) back into Defence. In its place will rise the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment (CAS) …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":19780,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[383,112,38,1129,110],"class_list":["post-19770","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-acquisition","tag-defence-materiel-organisation","tag-department-of-defence","tag-first-principles-review","tag-reform"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n\n