my views on the diarchy<\/a> clear, so there’s no need to recount them, but the merits of the shared services model deserve explanation.<\/p>\nThere\u2019s no denying that the shared services model separates the service chiefs from the direct control of the resources needed to deliver the outcomes that they\u2019re accountable for. In the most critical area\u2014the sustainment of military platforms and weapons systems\u2014the service chiefs already hold the purse strings and are able to make trade-offs between cost and the level of support they receive. And their ability to do so has been enhanced in recent years through cooperation with industry facilitated by DMO. In terms of garrison and corporate support, the capability managers don’t own \u00a0the budget, and service levels are largely set centrally. But this is no different from what happens in many parts of the private and public sectors.<\/p>\n
The essential point is that the shared services model (even in its current form) doesn\u2019t prevent capability managers being held to account for their performance in \u2018raising, training and sustaining\u2019 the forces under their command. With the improved monitoring and performance management promised under the One Defence model, the situation can only get better.<\/p>\n
But there are limits to apportioning accountability in a complex organisation like Defence. Consider capability development. The review envisages service chiefs \u2018having clear authority and accountability as sponsors for the delivery of capability outcomes to time and budget\u2019. This is unrealistic. The acquisition phase of capability development will be executed by the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group as the agent for the service chiefs. It\u2019s neither feasible nor practical for service chiefs to monitor and supervise the details of contracting, tender evaluation and project management. Conversely, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group can’t control the level of risk that they\u2019re directed to bear by the services and central decision-makers via the choice of equipment solutions. Capability development is a department-wide activity in which accountability rests with the diarchy and ultimately the minister.<\/p>\n
Over the years, a great deal of attention has been placed on Defence\u2019s structure and governance in an effort to \u2018improve accountability\u2019. One Defence<\/em> continues the heroic quest. But in the final analysis accountability is something that one person imposes on another. And while structures and governance can facilitate or impede accountability, the real problem in Defence has been a systemic unwillingness to manage underperformance.<\/p>\nThat unwillingness starts from the top of the organisation. No better example exists than the steady deterioration in the availability of the Collins<\/em>-class submarines during the 2000s\u2014a slow-motion crash which was only arrested by ministerial intervention.<\/p>\nThe First Principles Review is alert to the problem; when discussing personnel management it says that \u2018Defence has a sound performance management tool at its disposal, but is not using it effectively. We view this as a failing of leadership and management.\u2019 Their remedy is a \u2018transparent performance management system\u2026that recognises and rewards high performance and introduces consequences for underperformance and failure to deal with it.\u2019<\/p>\n
In my view, it\u2019s the single most important recommendation in the entire report.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Confronted with the First Principles Review\u2019s 70 recommendations, it\u2019s easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees. Viewed from arm’s length, the two most important outcomes aren’t actual recommendations \u00a0but the decisions\u2014one explicit, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":19918,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,33,782,1129],"class_list":["post-19916","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-capability","tag-chief-of-the-defence-force","tag-first-principles-review"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Accounting for accountability | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n