{"id":20054,"date":"2015-04-29T16:00:16","date_gmt":"2015-04-29T06:00:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=20054"},"modified":"2015-04-29T13:50:25","modified_gmt":"2015-04-29T03:50:25","slug":"us-japan-defence-guidelines-pushing-the-rebalance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/us-japan-defence-guidelines-pushing-the-rebalance\/","title":{"rendered":"US\u2013Japan defence guidelines: pushing the rebalance"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"SD<\/a><\/p>\n

The new US\u2013Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation<\/a> (PDF) and the accompanying joint statement<\/a> by the two countries\u2019 foreign and defence ministers commit both sides to do more with each other in relation to third countries than did the much shorter 1997 guidelines<\/a> when the East Asian security situation was less fraught.<\/p>\n

The first reading of the guidelines from a Southeast Asian perspective suggest that one of the East Asian goals of the US rebalance is well on the way to being realised, while another one may not be so. On the positive side, as successive US Quadrennial Defense Reviews have repeated, the US has long sought greater support<\/a> from allies and security partners in East Asia. The rebalance isn\u2019t only a commitment by the US to update its forward defence commitments in East Asia (and ring-fence them from sequestration) but also a reciprocal opportunity for its treaty allies and growing number of security partners to provide greater support to the US.<\/p>\n

In Northeast Asia, Japan, as shown by these new guidelines (and earlier unilateral defence reforms), has grasped this opportunity both for the defence of Japan and for supporting regional security through the guidelines\u2019 new foci on third country contingencies, ballistic missile defence and cooperation on regional capacity building. South Korea, as shown by its continuing hesitancy<\/a> over the deployment of a THAAD battery, less so.<\/p>\n

In Southeast Asia, broadly defined, Australia has also grasped the opportunity to support the US role in regional security, as shown by the US marines in Darwin, greater US access to Stirling naval facilities, among other moves. Singapore\u2019s decision to home port US littoral combat ships likewise, while the Aquino administration\u2019s politically painful commitment to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States shows greater Philippine support for a larger US role in Philippine defence. Thailand, as shown by its hesitancy<\/a> for US forces to use Thai air facilities, less so.<\/p>\n

Three factors\u2014two from the guidelines themselves and one external to them\u2014suggest that the rebalance\u2019s greater emphasis<\/a> on Southeast Asia is harder going.<\/p>\n