{"id":20167,"date":"2015-05-05T06:00:24","date_gmt":"2015-05-04T20:00:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=20167"},"modified":"2015-05-05T10:17:46","modified_gmt":"2015-05-05T00:17:46","slug":"naval-deconstruction-rands-shipbuilding-report","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/naval-deconstruction-rands-shipbuilding-report\/","title":{"rendered":"Naval deconstruction: RAND’s shipbuilding report"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Monopoly,<\/a><\/figure>\n

Commissioned in September 2014 under a $2.5 million contract<\/a>, the RAND report Australian\u2019s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise: Preparing for the 21st\u00a0Century<\/em><\/a> was released on 16 April 2015<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The government says it\u2019s developing an \u2018enterprise-level Naval Shipbuilding Plan\u2026 informed by the expert, independent advice from the RAND review\u2019<\/a>. It\u2019s important therefore that RAND\u2019s analysis is carefully evaluated. With this in mind, I\u2019ve prepared a critique of the RAND report for inclusion in next month\u2019s ASPI Defence Budget Brief. But with the clock ticking on shipbuilding policy, I\u2019ve decided to release the current draft<\/a>. RAND have been invited to respond on the Strategist<\/em>. Comments are welcome.<\/p>\n

The 297-page RAND report comes to several policy-relevant conclusions. For the purpose of this blog post, two stand out:<\/p>\n