a spatial and a positional competition<\/a> for influence. Nationalism underpins that competition and cuts away at the internationalist ethic required to strengthen the key pillars of the regional order. A saving grace is that, despite Xi Jinping\u2019s talk of \u2018Asia for the Asians\u2019, the region\u2019s fastest-rising great power, China, doesn\u2019t yet retail a narrative of a different regional order.<\/p>\nLet\u2019s turn to the second part of the puzzle: Australia as actor. In theory, this is the \u2018middle bit\u2019 of any Defence White Paper, holding together how we see the world and the capabilities we plan to use to defend against perceived threats. But in a grander sense it asks us about Australia\u2019s optimal \u2018design\u2019 for the world, because that design gives meaning and purpose to our strategic policy.<\/p>\n
As a country, we are what we are: an arid island continent, not situated along the strategically important Eurasian rimlands but at some distance from them. We have a large continent, a small population and an economy dominated by the mining, farming and service sectors. How do we see our own role in the world? In the broadest sense, Australian grand strategy hasn\u2019t changed since white settlement. We were born into a world of Western advantage, and our strategy has been to seek a secure Australia within a stable, liberal, prosperous global order. That order endures. So I don\u2019t believe we\u2019re engaged in a search for a new grand strategy. Rather, we seek a way to achieve our traditional objective in the 21st century.<\/p>\n
Still, in recent years Australian strategy has been marked by debate rather than consensus. Defence and security issues are typically seen as points of bipartisan agreement in Australian politics. That\u2019s true\u2014until it\u2019s not. The flurry of official declaratory policy since the White Paper in 2000\u2014Defence Updates in 2003, 2005 and 2007, Defence White Papers in 2009 and 2013, amongst other documents\u2014suggests that bipartisanship mightn\u2019t be as strong as some believe.<\/p>\n
Different White Papers have placed different emphases upon different \u2018Australias\u2019. The 2009 paper, for example, stressed Australia\u2019s role as a muscular, self-reliant power, reluctant to seek assistance from its ally unless it were to find itself entangled in a conflict with a great power. The 2013 paper placed more stress on our role as an order-builder, and saw strategy as an \u2018upstream\u2019 political activity and not just a \u2018downstream\u2019 military response. Each White Paper in turn invited criticism from those who believed that it portrayed not merely the environment, but Australia\u2019s strategic identity, incorrectly.<\/p>\n
Finally, let\u2019s turn to the third part of the puzzle: the constraints. In reality, many things constrain us, but here I want to talk about four factors in particular. Each holds us \u2018prisoner\u2019 by limiting our freedom to act in the world. The first factor is our declaratory settings, which make us a prisoner of our own mouth. Second is solvency, which makes us a prisoner of our wallet. Third is the need for public support for a strategic policy, which makes us a prisoner of our political system. And the fourth factor is capacity, which makes us a prisoner of our existing capabilities. This is the area where the rubber meets the road, where strategic policy ideas press up against the defined priorities, the affordable, the sellable and the doable.<\/p>\n
In the three parts of the puzzle lie the core of all the current contests in Australian strategic policy. The environment is complex and transformational, we\u2019re arguing among ourselves about the sort of purposeful actions and outcomes that would best suit our interests, and the constraints seem to press in upon us from all sides.<\/p>\n
The 2015 Defence White Paper has much ground to cover.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
With preparations for the 2015 Defence White Paper well underway, I\u2019d like to offer some thoughts about how strategic policy is\u2014ideally\u2014made. I see strategy as the purposeful actions undertaken by an actor within a specific …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":20222,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,883,549],"class_list":["post-20216","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia","tag-power","tag-strategic-policy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Making strategic policy: what\u2019s involved? | The Strategist<\/title>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n