{"id":20266,"date":"2015-05-11T06:00:33","date_gmt":"2015-05-10T20:00:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=20266"},"modified":"2015-05-08T16:04:43","modified_gmt":"2015-05-08T06:04:43","slug":"who-rules-in-writing-asias-rules","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/who-rules-in-writing-asias-rules\/","title":{"rendered":"Who rules in writing Asia\u2019s rules?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n The Asia Pacific is going through a vivid and significant rule-making tussle.<\/p>\n It’s unusual because rule-making and norm formation usually involve inching through decades. Power hierarchies tend to shift gradually and thus rules, by definition, are reasonably static. The international rules and norms based on power hierarchies follow gradually behind power shifts, but eventually adjustments happen. And a bit of adjusting is going on in Asia.<\/p>\n Credit one of the great political wordsmiths of our time for putting this in lights. Step forward Barack Obama in his State of the Union address<\/a>:<\/p>\n \u2018China wants to write the rules for the world\u2019s fastest-growing region.\u00a0 That would put our workers and businesses at a disadvantage.\u00a0 Why would we let that happen?\u00a0 We should write those rules.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Obama is in a rare political space (no more campaigns) where he can wield that most dangerous of political explosives \u2013 the big truth.<\/p>\n The context for Obama\u2019s rule-making plea to Congress is two other truths about the US and China that mean rule-writing power is in play.<\/p>\n The United States faces a long-term relative decline in its economic and military power in Asia. Trends don\u2019t get much bigger.<\/p>\n The important word is relative. The US will continue to grow. It\u2019s still an essential player. But its hegemonic role in Asia is fraying.<\/p>\n Obama\u2019s pushback against relative decline has two arms – the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the military pivot to Asia. Both have their problems. Not least because at the sharp end where policy and politics become pointy, these are both responses to China. And the tide is running for Beijing.<\/p>\n China is a status quo-tidal power<\/a>.<\/p>\n The relative shift is to Beijing. China exults at the way the international tide of trade and power has been running and wants to push along this evolution of the \u00a0status quo \u2014 stability accompanied by a continued shift of the tide in Beijing’s favour.<\/p>\n China understands this is a rule-writing moment. A previous meditation<\/a> on Asia\u2019s rules\u00a0made much of a speech by Xi Jinping that argued it\u2019s time for Asia\u2014led by China, obviously\u2014to set its own standards (and, implicitly, move on from US rules):<\/p>\n \u2018In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n China is acting the bully in South China Sea, remaking the rules with mountains of sand, changing reefs into military islands. Elsewhere, Beijing is buying friends using American techniques: write new rules and get others to sign up. Then everyone else will help entrench your system. And they\u2019ll even pay some of the costs\u2014soft power fuelled by a lot of cash can enlist plenty of supporters.<\/p>\n The initial Chinese response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership was to start negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. The trouble was this was just TPP-lite. It was responding to a US tune and playing by US rules.<\/p>\n In the past two years, Xi Jinping has shifted ground and really started the rules struggle. China\u2019s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road strategy<\/a> play to Beijing\u2019s strengths.<\/p>\n The AIIB and Silk Road reflect Beijing\u2019s system\u2014the government decides and directs while the state owned enterprises deliver. Not everything Beijing is promising will come to pass\u2014or be built, but it\u2019s about making the rules as well as making the roads.<\/p>\n Equally, the economic gains of the US TPP are not as great as boasted, as plenty of fine economists will happily explain. See this Canberra Times<\/em>\u00a0piece<\/a> on the proclaimed trade benefits of the TPP being \u2018a lot of nonsense.\u2019<\/p>\n The flaws in the TPP mean it doesn\u2019t shift the economic game as much as promised. As rule writing, though, it makes perfect sense. Create a preferential trade bloc that balances against China by excluding China.<\/p>\n Ignore the stuff about China being welcome to join TPP at some future date. Beijing isn\u2019t going to let the US use a trade treaty to re-write Chinese environmental or labour standards. For China, the TPP is about US rule as well as US rules.<\/p>\n US commitment or insouciance about maintaining US rules will be the way Asia views the Congress vote on giving Obama fast track authority to conclude the TPP. If Congress rejects fast track it will do much more than merely kick the issue downstream to be dealt with by the next President.<\/p>\n