Sydney<\/em><\/strong><\/td>\nJune 2017<\/td>\n June 2018<\/td>\n March 2019<\/td>\n March 2020<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\nSource: various ministerial media releases<\/em><\/p>\nThe government now plans a limited tender process \u2018seeking proposals to either insert a managing contractor into ASC for the remainder of the AWD build or to further enhance ASC capability through a partnering agreement\u2019.<\/p>\n
In the event of a partnering agreement, it would likely be akin to the interim measures already adopted. The difference would be that a single firm would provide a team of skilled personnel to work alongside ASC. Nonetheless, with no skin in the game, it would be a case of \u2018all care, no responsibility\u2019 for the partner.<\/p>\n
In the event of the managing contractor option, things get more interesting. However, it appears that the proposal is not<\/em> to bring in a firm to take over the whole project, but rather only the ASC component. Similarly, there\u2019s no suggestion that all of ASC is going to be put into new hands. Thus, far from having a private sector firm run the project, the managing contractor will operate within<\/em> ASC and with<\/em> the existing alliance partners.<\/p>\nIf so, this will further complicate the already intricate arrangements of the alliance. Assuming the new managing contractor works under an incentive scheme (rather than a cost-plus contract), we\u2019ll have four parties\u2014ASC, Raytheon, Defence and the managing contractor\u2014operating under two layers of contractual incentives. Perverse incentives can\u2019t be ruled out.\u00a0Moreover, capable firms may be hesitant to risk their reputation by tying their fate to the performance of the parties that got us to where we are today.<\/p>\n
How will it work? The government\u2019s implied that the new \u2018baseline\u2019 for the project was a precondition for seeking tenders. Do they think that the costs are well enough understood to have a managing contractor sign up to a fixed price contract? That might be difficult. Bidders will find it hard to properly assess the risk before signing up. So it might have to be a cost-plus contract with incentives for productivity and schedule.<\/p>\n
Would a bolder and more decisive approach be possible? Certainly today\u2019s approach is half pregnant compared with what was done back in the 1980s. Perhaps the alliance contract is simply too difficult a knot to disentangle; the current approach might be as good as it get.<\/p>\n
However, given the massive cost blowout, it\u2019s almost certain that the incentive\/penalty provisions of the alliance contract\u200e have been exhausted and the participants are now working under cost-plus arrangements. This is bad news for the taxpayer since the parties have little reason (beyond reputation) to improve their performance. But at this stage, the Commonwealth probably has step-in rights. If so, why not bring in an experienced firm to manage the whole project?<\/p>\n
Whatever the arrangement\u2014 partnering agreement, managing contractor, or something bolder\u2014there\u2019s an implicit incentive beyond any direct financial considerations; the chance to be in pole position for the eventual sale of ASC and the lucrative Future Frigate program due around 2020. Again, history may be helpful. After Tenix finished the two half-complete FFGs languishing in the government shipyard, it went on to execute the very successful Anzac frigate program. Of course, taking on the completion of AWD could be a two-edged sword. If the program can\u2019t be turned around, it\u2019s a poisoned chalice.<\/p>\n
Only time will tell whether the current plan works, but the future of naval shipbuilding is on the line. Although the government is committed to deliver \u2018an enterprise-level naval shipbuilding plan\u2019 later this year, the sad experience of the AWD will surely cast a long shadow. On the government\u2019s own figures, we\u2019re getting three ships for the price of nine. That\u2019s probably unfair to local industry\u2014the lessons learned from a government-owned shipyard can\u2019t be simply extrapolated to the private sector\u2014but that\u2019s how the cards have fallen.<\/p>\n
And the game\u2019s not over yet. With 25 months before the first vessel is delivered, a lot could happen. Systems integration, including the Aegis combat system, vessel fit-out and at-sea trials all remain ahead. On past experience, these are much more difficult tasks than vessel fabrication.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
To properly understand last week\u2019s announcement from the government about the beleaguered Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project, some background is needed. Back in June 2014, the government received the independent \u2018White\u2013Winter report\u2019 into the project. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":20677,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[383,113,304],"class_list":["post-20671","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-acquisition","tag-air-warfare-destroyer","tag-royal-australian-navy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Saving the AWD project\u2014too little, too late? | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n