{"id":20939,"date":"2015-06-10T10:14:14","date_gmt":"2015-06-10T00:14:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=20939"},"modified":"2015-06-11T14:43:27","modified_gmt":"2015-06-11T04:43:27","slug":"the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/","title":{"rendered":"The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"640\" height=\"427\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-20942\" src=\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z.jpg\" alt=\"AK-47\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z.jpg 640w, https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z-205x137.jpg 205w, https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z-332x221.jpg 332w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Barely a day goes by when ISIL isn\u2019t in the news, or there\u2019s no new report detailing its activities, adroit use of social media or recruiting methods. In the midst of all this, al-Qaeda has not only been relatively quiet but relatively forgotten. There\u2019s a sense that it\u2019s become the \u2018moderate\u2019 stream in an increasingly brutal, barbaric and violent Islamist movement. But we shouldn\u2019t forget al-Qaeda\u2019s resilience\u2014and its tendency to be just as brutal, barbaric and bloodthirsty as ISIL.<\/p>\n<p>Today ASPI releases <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/publications\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\" target=\"_blank\">a new report examining what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda<\/a> and how it may react. How will al-Qaeda seek to regain the oxygen of publicity that\u2019s central to terrorist organisations if they\u2019re to recruit, grow and, ultimately, challenge their enemies?<\/p>\n<p>ISIL poses a genuine threat to security in the Middle East and Western countries. It has sophisticated modes of recruitment, significant funding and a loyal following in the West. It\u2019s arguably the most threatening terrorist group in operation. However, it also threatens al-Qaeda. ISIL has overtaken al-Qaeda to become the \u2018organisation of choice\u2019 for aspiring <em>jihadis<\/em>. \u00a0In this sense, al-Qaeda is being outmanoeuvred and outplayed at its own game, losing the manpower and military means that it needs to achieve its political ambitions.<\/p>\n<p>For al-Qaeda, something has to give if it\u2019s going to survive. Based on the available evidence, there are four potential scenarios for al-Qaeda\u2019s response:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Status quo: uneasy bedfellows<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Al-Qaeda has only limited human and financial resources; its adherents in Europe are essentially autonomous and lie beyond the reach and control of al-Zawahiri and the historical leadership of Al-Qaeda Core (AQC). The franchises in Yemen, North Africa, Indonesia and India remain semi-autonomous but are equally deprived of the capability to launch international attacks to recapture the imagination and support of aspiring <em>jihadis<\/em>. Direct confrontation with ISIL isn\u2019t feasible, not least because it would cause further schisms in the global <em>jihadi <\/em>movement and alienate the remnants of al-Qaeda\u2019s support base. Left with little option other than to muddle through in the hope that ISIL is a flash in the pan rather than the resilient organisation that al-Qaeda has proven itself to be, AQC elects for an uneasy stance of tolerating ISIL, neither supporting nor opposing it. In short, rather than seeking to challenge ISIL ideologically or militarily, al-Qaeda accommodates ISIL as an uneasy bedfellow in the wider global <em>jihadi <\/em>movement.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Merger: putting differences aside<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>AQC recognises that its ability to conduct spectacular attacks is currently diminished, and that it doesn\u2019t have sufficient resources to achieve its political objectives. Rather than seeking to recapture the imagination of its supporters and increase recruitment, it seeks a formal alliance with ISIL. In joining forces, al-Zawahiri must put to one side the abiding differences between the two groups\u2019 strategic visions by forming a pact with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; the merger leads to wider sharing and pooling of resources and exchanges of fighters for specific operations and helps to build a genuinely global <em>jihadi <\/em>alliance.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Wither: the failure of confrontation<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Al-Qaeda seeks to regain the limelight and the support of the wider <em>jihadi <\/em>movement by confronting ISIL directly, both militarily through Jabhat al-Nusra and reputationally through its media channels. However, its efforts will fail: ISIL is more adept in its media campaign and has sufficient military resources to counter Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qaeda loses precious financial and military resources, compounding failure. Continued attempts to rectify the situation result in further losses and, as the movement attenuates, members increasingly defect to ISIL. Over time, al-Qaeda loses its identity before becoming effectively defunct as its remaining members flock to ISIL.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>A spectacular attack: a game of one-upmanship<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Al-Qaeda channels some of its remaining resources into a spectacular centrally-organised and funded attack. If successful, the attack allows it to regain the headlines and experience a surge in popularity, reputation and, ultimately, recruitment. Having recaptured the limelight, al-Qaeda plots further attacks of a similar magnitude using its new-found resources. As al-Qaeda slowly regains its position as the \u2018terrorist group of choice\u2019 for aspiring <em>jihadis<\/em>, members of ISIL begin to defect to the more internationalist and globally organised al-Qaeda. ISIL, recognising that it\u2019s losing ground to a rejuvenated al-Qaeda, plots significant attacks in an effort to regalvanise the organisation and hold on to its recruits. As its attacks succeed, it recaptures the imagination of its supporters and experiences increased recruitment and popularity. This game of one-upmanship drives each party to increase the ferocity of its campaigns.<\/p>\n<p>All four options are feasible, yet the first three options are marginally less likely than the final\u2014and most worrying\u2014scenario: al-Qaeda pursues a campaign of international attacks in order to regain the limelight. There are a number of reasons for this.<\/p>\n<p>First, al-Qaeda has, throughout its long and bloody history, shown itself to be a resilient organisation, remarkably adept in exploiting weaknesses in its political environment. Second, while al-Qaeda has been significantly challenged by ISIL, it has shown, not least in Yemen and North Africa, that it still has a loyal following and can still perpetrate significant acts of terrorist violence. Third, al-Qaeda has historically been at its most dangerous when the international community has taken its eye off the ball: in 2000, opportunities were missed to dismantle the nascent organisation, which resulted in the attacks of 9\/11. Similarly, in 2005, AQAP was all but defeated, but Western governments turned their attention elsewhere and allowed the organisation to re-establish itself.<\/p>\n<p>ISIL is a real threat and must be targeted, but al-Qaeda shouldn\u2019t be forgotten. It\u2019s a resilient and resolute terrorist organisation but it\u2019s also weaker than it has been for many years. We should use this brief opportunity to dismantle the organisation completely.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Barely a day goes by when ISIL isn\u2019t in the news, or there\u2019s no new report detailing its activities, adroit use of social media or recruiting methods. In the midst of all this, al-Qaeda has &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":49,"featured_media":20942,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[155,273,993,218],"class_list":["post-20939","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-al-qaeda","tag-counterterrorism","tag-isil","tag-middle-east"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v19.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Barely a day goes by when ISIL isn\u2019t in the news, or there\u2019s no new report detailing its activities, adroit use of social media or recruiting methods. In the midst of all this, al-Qaeda has ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2015-06-10T00:14:14+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-06-11T04:43:27+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"640\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"427\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Tobias Feakin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Tobias Feakin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI&#039;s analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/06\/3267714403_dbd98ef080_z.jpg\",\"width\":640,\"height\":427,\"caption\":\"AK-47\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/\",\"name\":\"The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda? | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2015-06-10T00:14:14+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-06-11T04:43:27+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/84f461839f3f37e79509040ae4eeedcd\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda?\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/84f461839f3f37e79509040ae4eeedcd\",\"name\":\"Tobias Feakin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/a8346dd3562a4d00483b16ff7e8b8df6?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/a8346dd3562a4d00483b16ff7e8b8df6?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Tobias Feakin\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/tobias-feakin\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda? | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-jihad-what-next-for-isil-and-al-qaeda\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda? | The Strategist","og_description":"Barely a day goes by when ISIL isn\u2019t in the news, or there\u2019s no new report detailing its activities, adroit use of social media or recruiting methods. 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