{"id":21285,"date":"2015-06-30T06:00:18","date_gmt":"2015-06-29T20:00:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=21285"},"modified":"2015-06-30T09:09:44","modified_gmt":"2015-06-29T23:09:44","slug":"keep-on-truckin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/keep-on-truckin\/","title":{"rendered":"Keep on truckin\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Having to resist the urge to take a cheap shot is an occupational hazard in my business, and one that I don’t always successfully avoid. Once such was the title I gave to a review of Project LAND 121 \u2018Overlander\u2019 (replacement of Army’s 7,000 field vehicles and trailers). Published in the 2010 Budget Brief, I called it \u2018How many DCPs does it take to buy a truck?\u2019<\/p>\n One of my first jobs in Defence back in 1994 was to conduct analysis in support of Overlander (and the then-Army 21 program), and I wondered even then why this was being made so complicated. To see it still making its way through the system 16 years later really had me scratching my head. Five years later, Overlander is now in its third decade; an acerbic Tweet<\/a> last week observed that it\u2019s now been running several times longer than WW2.<\/p>\n Two things happened last week that made me think about it again. First, I heard a talk from DMO’s Land Systems Division on the project at ASPI\u2019s land forces conference. Then, I got a copy of the Australian National Audit Office’s new report on LAND 121 Phase 3B<\/a> (replacement of medium and heavy vehicles). Those two sources allow us to piece together an interesting, if doleful, story.<\/p>\n