{"id":21326,"date":"2015-07-01T06:00:40","date_gmt":"2015-06-30T20:00:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=21326"},"modified":"2015-07-01T11:11:24","modified_gmt":"2015-07-01T01:11:24","slug":"the-grinding-geopolitics-of-a-grexit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-grinding-geopolitics-of-a-grexit\/","title":{"rendered":"The grinding geopolitics of a Grexit"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Greece’s economic woes feature daily on the British broadsheets. The high drama negotiations between Greece and Europe have evoked a narrative akin to that of David and Goliath. Yet as Europe’s politicians attempt to balance party politics with economic reform, the fear of a Grexit is real. While such a move has obvious financial implications for the Eurozone, Europe needs to consider the geopolitical consequences of a Grexit with equal vigour.<\/p>\n Nobody is quite sure what a Grexit would look like, but let’s presuppose a\u00a0breakdown of negotiations did occur whereby Greece was economically and politically ostracized\u00a0from the EU. Who would Greece turn to for international credibility and support? Would it, for instance, shift completely away from Europe, and seek a new era of solace with Russia?<\/p>\n It\u2019s no secret that PM\u00a0Alexis Tsipras is fond of\u00a0Greece’s Christian Orthodox partner. His proactive engagement of Russia over the past 6 months hasn\u2019t been well received by his European counterparts. But\u00a0Tsipras is no fool. He knows that using Russia as a bargaining chip requires more diplomatic\u00a0maneuvering\u00a0than simply playing\u00a0Europe off against Russia. In geopolitical terms, there\u2019s little Russia can offer to help redress either the Greek economy or Greece’s international standing. While the planned extension of a Russian gas pipeline through Greece is something to watch with interest, we shouldn\u2019t assume that\u00a0the recent MoU<\/a> premeditates a general Greek realignment from Europe to Russia. This planned extension has in itself become a protracted process of diplomatic negotiations and delayed timelines. Greece doesn\u2019t stand to benefit from this MoU anytime soon.<\/p>\n More broadly, Greece is hardly in a position of power in its dealings with Russia. Unsustainable\u00a0levels of debt have placed the state in a vulnerable position, and risk of economic exploitation by Russia for immediate financial remedy seems shortsighted at best. We also shouldn\u2019t underestimate the political realism of Putin and his calculated\u00a0antagonism\u00a0of the West. Putin is no doubt aware that overplaying his relationship with Greece may compel the West to inflict harsher sanctions and stricter policy positions on Russia. That being said, recent history demonstrates Putin\u2019s\u00a0unpredictability\u2014a strategic practitioner\u00a0guided as much by realpolitik\u00a0logic as his cloudy nationalist rhetoric.<\/p>\n By considering the Greece\u2013Russia scenario, we\u2019re able to uncover the key geopolitical consequence of a Grexit: the fear of non-Western power penetration. Could China, for instance, enhance relations with Greece as a means for establishing a firm diplomatic and economic footing in the region? Of course, such\u00a0scenarios\u00a0need to take into account the reality of Greece’s standing security arrangements.\u00a0The key point to remember here is that regardless of whether a Grexit occurs, Greece will still remain a member of NATO. That Greece is unlikely to risk its membership of this security alliance is something of a reassurance.<\/p>\n