submarine and shipbuilding programs<\/a>. Thus far there is every sign that these lessons have been acknowledged and are being applied.<\/p>\nHowever the primary issue isn\u2019t about where the submarines will be built. That will follow on from all the earlier activity as I have outlined above, and will be constrained by the level of knowledge and expertise that we have assembled and developed here in Australia.<\/p>\n
We should maximise Australian involvement from the very start\u2014and in all aspects of the design and development as well as construction and sustainment\u2014in order to learn on the job and determine what we need to sustain a submarine building industry.<\/p>\n
One major consideration will be the transfer of technology to Australia to be used ultimately for sustainment, comprising maintenance, modification and modernisation. We should advance this as early as practicable to order to maximise Australian industry involvement.<\/p>\n
The three contenders in the CEP have been asked to offer three options: an all-Australian build, a hybrid build with the first boats built offshore and a completely foreign build. The hybrid build is the most practical solution to avoid the delays and other risks inherent in the all-Australian build arising from the lead time to get the program up and running with a skilled workforce; and the initial lack of experience in working with the designer<\/p>\n
One can easily foresee the first-of-class being built offshore, with some Australian content and then at some point in the first batch of submarines the final assembly moving to South Australia, perhaps with some modules constructed in the source country.<\/p>\n
I discussed these issues with the representative of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) which has been contracted by the Japanese government to act for them in the CEP. Japan has undertaken technology transfers in the past in large-scale complex engineering fields such as mining and construction and there is a recognition it can readily be done again for SEA 1000<\/p>\n
DCNS and TKMS have already stated publicly that this approach is feasible which adds weight to a transitional program in which the latter submarines are built here. The remaining question is how best to plan this to meet performance, cost of ownership and delivery schedule requirements while at the same time maximising Australian involvement.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
There are other important dimensions to consider in a large complex project such as the Future Submarine Program (FSP) SEA 1000 besides the economic arguments that we so often read about. As the Rand Corporation …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":21404,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,1051,304,579],"class_list":["post-21402","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-future-submarine-project","tag-royal-australian-navy","tag-shipbuilding"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
SEA 1000: the design challenge | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n