{"id":215,"date":"2012-07-17T11:51:17","date_gmt":"2012-07-17T01:51:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=215"},"modified":"2012-08-06T15:22:19","modified_gmt":"2012-08-06T05:22:19","slug":"the-uses-and-abuses-of-defence-white-papers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-uses-and-abuses-of-defence-white-papers\/","title":{"rendered":"The uses and abuses of defence white papers"},"content":{"rendered":"
Defence white papers are usually hailed as definitive statements of policy, and we can expect the 2013 one to be no exception. The phrase has an air of the laboratory about it\u2014of boffins toiling to frame the unimpeachable results of evidence-based policymaking.<\/p>\n
The idea of white papers as policy icons was never more on display than in the 2009 version<\/a>. Nostalgia buffs can review the 83 media statements<\/a> released on 2 May that year, where we were told the document was \u2018the most comprehensive statement on defence ever produced\u2019.<\/p>\n The reality is a bit different. White papers are political documents, produced for and owned (at least temporarily) by governments and designed for purposes beyond detailing high-minded policy. The impetus to produce them has often been the unwelcome arrival of a strategic shock, and they\u2019re most commonly abandoned after a change of Prime Minister.<\/p>\n The 1976 white paper<\/a>\u00a0modestly started a journey to that elusive goal of \u2018defence self-reliance\u2019. It was a reaction to the Vietnam rout a year earlier and the knowledge that we\u2019d need to do more to look after our own security. The paper\u2019s spending projections were overturned in 1980 when a spooked Fraser government promised to boost spending after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan\u2014a promise that never materialised.<\/p>\n The 1987 white paper<\/a>\u00a0was spurred by a reforming Labor government\u2019s need to design a defence policy that the ALP could support. In its early years, at the height of the anti-nuclear movement in Australia, the Hawke government faced a crisis in the defence relationship with the US. New Zealand under David Lange had defected from ANZUS in 1984. The 1987 white paper, and Paul Dibb\u2019s 1986 report on Australia\u2019s defence capabilities<\/a>\u00a0before it, built the case for an alliance relationship and a \u2018defence of Australia\u2019 focus that Labor could comfortably own. As political purposes go, this was a good one\u2014it bought Australia a generation of bipartisan support for the key pillars of defence policy.<\/p>\n The 1994 white paper<\/a>\u00a0responded to another big strategic change\u2014the fall of the Soviet Union\u2014by reaffirming the 1987 policy settings. Unlike its predecessors, the 1994 edition wasn\u2019t the result of a change of government but a change of Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Like the promised 2013 white paper, the 1994 document had a tough time trying to look fresh without changing much.<\/p>\n The spur for the 2000 white paper<\/a>\u00a0was another major strategic shock\u2014the East Timor crisis and, behind that, the democratic transformation of Indonesia\u2014and was suffused with the fear of a potential conflict with the Indonesians. Although John Howard was criticised in some circles for not starting a defence white paper in his first term, at least he owned the 2000 policy. He\u2019d been through the Cabinet discussions, thought his way through the issues and didn\u2019t feel the need to produce another defence white paper for the rest of his multiple terms of office. It\u2019s good when governments own their policy statements.<\/p>\n