{"id":22258,"date":"2015-08-28T12:30:19","date_gmt":"2015-08-28T02:30:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=22258"},"modified":"2015-08-31T12:54:19","modified_gmt":"2015-08-31T02:54:19","slug":"defence-acquisition-capability-managers-and-the-capability-and-sustainment-group","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/defence-acquisition-capability-managers-and-the-capability-and-sustainment-group\/","title":{"rendered":"Defence acquisition, capability managers and the Capability and Sustainment Group"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Two recent articles on Defence acquisition one here<\/a> by my colleague Mark Thomson and another in the AFR here<\/a> by John Kerin quoting Warren King caused me to reflect on the long journey Defence has already travelled in the pursuit of acquisition reform and the enormous challenge it still faces as it stands up the new Capability and Sustainment Group (CASG) and implements the \u2018Smart Buyer\u2019<\/a> initiative.<\/p>\n The RAND<\/a> Study into the lessons learnt from submarine programs in the UK, US and Australia observed (and later reiterated by the Parliamentary Review<\/a> into Defence Capital Projects), that \u2018\u2026technical risks must be identified early, and much thought must be given to deciding, with industry (emphasis added),<\/em> the appropriate form of the contract and the incentive and risk sharing clauses built into the contract. Getting this wrong can almost guarantee problems with the conduct of the program and the relationships between the government and the contractor.\u2019<\/p>\n These issues aren\u2019t new. Paul Rizzo\u00a0identified<\/a>\u00a0the need for technical skills in his review of naval engineering. John Coles\u00a0highlighted<\/a>\u00a0(PDF)\u00a0in his Review the need for knowledgeable buyers to ensure program success. The \u2018Smart Buyer\u2019 function recommended by the First Principles Review (FPR) is clearly in response to these warnings but again the gap between the recommendation and implementation is as wide as ever. The re-occurring problem has been the Commonwealth\u2019s ability to work with industry to achieve a capability outcome with some degree of consistency and confidence.<\/p>\n A well-run parallel bidding process as planned for the future submarine project certainly offers part of the solution. It should result in a refined solution, improved value for money as all parties refine and reduce risk and, most importantly, an improved capability outcome. Collaboration and transparency will be the key attributes of success but these can only be empowered by knowledgeable buyers and sellers.<\/p>\n Regardless of how successful the parallel bidding process is, the next phase\u2014parallel negotiation\u2014presents a real challenge if the well-informed buyer is missing.<\/p>\n Acquisition folklore tells us that parallel negotiation is the only true path to acquisition salvation. A process in which continued competitive tension improves schedule, price and process. Good process is rewarded with a good outcome, which is defined in terms of schedule and price.<\/p>\n The alternative view is that parallel negotiations increases the cost of bidding for both the Commonwealth, which needs to buy-in an evaluation team, and the bidders because of the time taken and the size of the team necessary to respond several more times over the length of the \u00a0negotiations process. What\u2019s not spoken of is that this approach also enables an ill-informed buyer to hide behind a process which is invariably run by a team of earnest but constrained individuals with no guarantee of a better outcome for taxpayers or for the capability users. It may be \u2018safe\u2019 because it has a \u2018defensible\u2019 audit trail, but there\u2019s no level of assurance that the final outcome will deliver good capability in a timely or cost-effective manner.<\/p>\n