explained with startling clarity<\/a>, defending ships is hard and getting harder as they become easier to find and to hit. This reflects technological trends that began in the late 19th century and are much more likely to accelerate than abate.<\/p>\nThis doesn\u2019t mean warships can\u2019t be defended, but it does mean that the costs of trying and the chances of failing both rise to the point that it\u2019s not worth the effort. No matter how much we spend on warships, Australia won\u2019t be able to achieve strategically significant degrees of sea control against any of the highly capable maritime forces now evolving in Asia. So it\u2019s a waste of money to try.<\/p>\n
That\u2019s the bad news. The good news is that with careful investment we can turn these tables and deny sea control even to very capable adversaries. All the factors that make our ships so hard to defend make it relatively easy for us to attack an adversary\u2019s.<\/p>\n
The second reason we\u2019d be wrong to set our sights on sea control against capable adversaries is that we don\u2019t need it. With effective sea denial we can defend our own territory, help prevent the intrusion of hostile forces into our neighbourhood, and support our allies in the wider Asian region. We couldn\u2019t project land power by sea\u2014but our land forces will always be too small to achieve any serious strategic effects against any major power anyway. So that\u2019s no loss.<\/p>\n
Some say we need sea control to protect our trade. But against whom? Not our principle customers, surely? Interdependence and mutual vulnerability mean that the kind of \u2018trade wars\u2019 which have framed naval thinking for centuries disappeared long ago. No major power has tried to interdict another\u2019s maritime trade for 200 years, except in the two world wars.<\/p>\n
And how could we defend our trade anyway? A dozen frigates couldn\u2019t defend even a fraction of our massive trade flows. A far better way to prevent attacks on our trade would be to threaten retaliation against the trade of our adversary\u2014for which we need sea denial forces, rather than sea control.<\/p>\n
Of course warships remain invaluable for operations in uncontested waters, so we need a good-sized fleet of modestly-sized and equipped ships just like the old ANZACs. Let\u2019s build more of those, and build them the way the ANZACs were built. And spend the money we save on more submarines. And if we get the acquisition strategy right, we might even be able to build them competitively in Australia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Both Kevin Andrews, the Defence Minister, and David Feeney, Shadow Assistant Minister for Defence, were kind enough to respond to my criticisms of the Government\u2019s naval shipbuilding program in a recent column, and especially its …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":22287,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,833,1051,1157,579],"class_list":["post-22286","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-frigate","tag-future-submarine-project","tag-future-surface-fleet","tag-shipbuilding"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Naval shipbuilding in Australia: a strategic necessity? | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n