{"id":22475,"date":"2015-09-15T06:00:51","date_gmt":"2015-09-14T20:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=22475"},"modified":"2015-09-15T08:55:59","modified_gmt":"2015-09-14T22:55:59","slug":"avoiding-incoherence-in-syria","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/avoiding-incoherence-in-syria\/","title":{"rendered":"Avoiding incoherence in Syria"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Tony Abbott\u2019s decision<\/a> to join US-led airstrikes in Syria brought\u00a0a degree of legal and military coherence to Australia\u2019s role in the fight against Islamic State (IS). Confining military action to the territory of Iraq has served to reinforce both a perverse interpretation of international law, and strategic incoherence in Australian military involvement. Resolving those legal and military inconsistencies is welcome, but leaves unanswered the intractable political questions that stand in the way of restoring peaceful governance to the Middle East.<\/p>\n Iraq would be within its rights<\/a> under the United Nations Charter to use force in self-defence against an aggressor state, and could do so \u2018collectively\u2019 with allied assistance. Legal controversy arises, however, where the aggressor isn\u2019t the Syrian state, but a terrorist organisation operating within its territory. This has led to serious questions about the legality of intervening in a sovereign state without consent<\/a>, with Shadow Foreign Minister Tanya Plibersek initially arguing<\/a> that there\u2019s \u2018no such clear legal basis for Australian involvement in Syria.\u2019<\/p>\n The Australian government has repeatedly referred to areas of Syria under IS control as \u2018ungoverned space\u2019<\/a>, where attacks are launched with impunity into Iraq, which is thereby empowered to respond. That mirrors the US legal argument<\/a> that President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s loss of government control has left him \u2018unwilling or unable\u2019 to prevent entire regions of Syria being used as a base for IS. Those statements provide an example of the US and its allies seeking to adapt rules of international law to the changing nature of global security threats.<\/p>\n Competing sovereignties<\/a> are at stake here, with Syria\u2019s claim to inviolability of its formal territorial boundaries proving incompatible with Iraq\u2019s real enjoyment of sovereign rights. International law resolves uncertainty not as politically disinterested rules, but rather as a set of evolving principles developed by states to advance international peace and security. Where law risks becoming the guardian of lawlessness, states are obliged to engage in global conversation to realign rules with common political and moral purposes.<\/p>\n Confusion surrounding existing legal rules is evident in a problematic analysis<\/a> by former foreign minister Gareth Evans. For Evans, international law is \u2018just sufficient to make defensible the extension of the operation into Syria without that state\u2019s consent.\u2019 In saying this, Evans necessarily adopts the \u2018unwilling or unable\u2019 corollary to self-defence \u2018to the extent that we\u2014along with the US\u2014would be assisting Iraq to defend its own people from attack initiated or commanded across the border.\u2019 That remains a narrow right that can\u2019t encompass actions against the Syrian government.<\/p>\n That\u2019s no black-letter legal interpretation, but advocacy of the enlarged right of self-defence. Yet Evans erroneously speaks of Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and the US State Department\u2019s reference to \u2018ungoverned territory\u2019 as being \u2018another legal justification\u2019 altogether. It is the same doctrine Evans presumes, albeit while mischaracterising the government\u2019s position as a claim to \u2018completely empty space, where international forces can more or less do what they like.\u2019 In announcing airstrikes, Abbott emphasised<\/a> that \u2018we have no legal basis at this point in time for wider strikes in Syria and we don\u2019t intend to make wider strikes in Syria.\u2019<\/p>\n Evans\u2019 most troubling (and contradictory) conclusion is to deny the legal absence of governance, since IS is \u2018certainly occupying and governing that space at the moment.\u2019 The very purpose of rules on the use of force is to provide legitimate means for addressing threats to international peace and security when states turn to lawlessness. Evans\u2019 interpretation appears to suggest a legal barrier to defeating any terrorist organisation once they gain a sufficient level of control within another state\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n Evans\u2019 recommendation that it\u2019s \u2018better to hang one\u2019s hat on the collective self-defence justification\u2019 is a case of furious agreement that the \u2018unwilling and unable\u2019 standard is a necessary evolution to make international law work. Plibersek has belatedly confirmed<\/a> Labor\u2019s acceptance of the principle\u2014more than a year after it was set out by our allies to provide policy guidance. Where there\u2019s legal consensus between the government and the Opposition\u2019s most distinguished foreign policy elder statesman\u2014as well as author of the influential \u2018Responsibility to Protect\u2019 doctrine\u2014the evidence is compelling that the law has shifted<\/a>.<\/p>\n Establishing a clear legal position is equally important to the coherence of Australian military strategy. It makes no tactical sense to limit airstrikes according to national borders that the enemy doesn\u2019t recognise. But more significantly, Australia\u2019s modest airpower contributesmore to the legitimacy than material capabilities of coalition forces. It\u2019s insincere to support a campaign that already includes US airstrikes in Syria, yet claim to have no position on their validity. If Australia intends to lend legitimacy to a cause it believes in, the clearest way is to join a likeminded legal coalition.<\/p>\n