{"id":22522,"date":"2015-09-17T14:30:04","date_gmt":"2015-09-17T04:30:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=22522"},"modified":"2017-02-12T20:49:24","modified_gmt":"2017-02-12T09:49:24","slug":"another-lap-of-the-quad","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/another-lap-of-the-quad\/","title":{"rendered":"Another lap of the Quad"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Recent comments<\/a> made by Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews regarding the possibility of four nation naval exercises involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States suggest that there might be some interest in Canberra in dusting off the ‘Quadrilateral’ security framework. The Minister didn’t invoke the Quad explicitly and he’d understand the likely negative response from Beijing if he had done so. But such an exercise would closely resemble Exercise Malabar from 2007<\/a>, an activity that paralleled a security dialogue between the four countries<\/a> in the same year.<\/p>\n Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe originally initiated the Quad in 2006, which was followed by a brief flurry of interest and a 2007 meeting before it was quietly removed from the international agenda. That was due in no small part to vociferous objections from China, which issued diplomatic protests<\/a> to all four participants. Early in his tenure as PM, Kevin Rudd unilaterally opted out<\/a>, consistent with his view that Australia shouldn’t tie itself to North Asian security. Since then, the Quad hasn’t been pursued at the government-to-government level, although second track dialogues<\/a> between academics and think tanks have explored the pros and cons of reinvigorating the arrangement.<\/p>\n Despite the Quad\u2019s demise, there’s been plenty of activity between the four countries in various combinations, including bilateral and trilateral (‘not-quite-Quadrilateral<\/a>‘)\u00a0discussions, exercises and security arrangements. That’s not surprising\u2014economic and security interests overlap significantly, and the four tend to see the world through a similar lens. The problem, of course, is that a grouping of liberal democratic states interested in sustaining the rules-based regional order naturally comes into competition with China\u2014a non-democratic state that has increasingly made its desire for change obvious.<\/p>\n A Quad resurgence will get the same angry response from Beijing as it did the first time around. At the time there was a flurry of unconvincing denials that the Quad was intended as a counter to China, and there’s no doubt that Chinese diplomatic efforts to stymie it paid off pretty well. But that was then and this is now. China\u2019s trajectory was much less clear in 2007 than it is today. Then there was a credible argument for not being unnecessarily antagonistic but in light of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, that line of reasoning is less compelling now. The Quad’s time might have come.<\/p>\n The Quad has increasingly been up for discussion over recent years. Shortly after his return to the top job in December 2012, Abe\u2019s by-line appeared on an op-ed <\/a>that extolled the positive contribution that \u2018Asia\u2019s democratic security diamond\u2019 could make to regional security. It has been claimed that\u00a0the piece was conceived solely in the Prime Minister\u2019s Office, which effectively sidelined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Abe promoted a failed foreign policy initiative from his first term.<\/p>\n Indian PM Narendra Modi was reported to have raised the Quad<\/a> with Australia\u2019s then-PM Tony Abbott in New Delhi last September. Modi is also said to have spoken<\/a> to US President Barack Obama about the Quad at India\u2019s Republic Day celebrations<\/a> in January this year. That speaks not only to Modi\u2019s eastward tilt towards the US, but also to how Indian strategic thinking is changing as it feels pressure from China at the disputed Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n