{"id":22568,"date":"2015-09-22T14:30:21","date_gmt":"2015-09-22T04:30:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=22568"},"modified":"2015-09-21T11:44:56","modified_gmt":"2015-09-21T01:44:56","slug":"australias-wgs-communications-what-went-wrong","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australias-wgs-communications-what-went-wrong\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia\u2019s WGS communications\u2014what went wrong?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n When I was surveying the communications capability of the ADF<\/a> back in 2010, I made the following observation:<\/p>\n \u2018Australian users now have access to the US-built Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system. This \u2018off-the-shelf\u2019 purchase provides a good capability for the ADF and greatly facilitates connectivity with US forces.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n I assumed that we’d simply mirror the American implementation of the system\u2014clearly that was wrong. It’s true that the ADF uses the WGS system, but it’s via a series of workarounds, while the ‘off-the-shelf’ WGS project is now on the ‘Projects of Concern’ list<\/a>. This post is my attempt to explain how that happened\u2014and how we lost five years of capability and return on investment in the process.<\/p>\n The WGS is a high bandwidth satellite communications system<\/a> designed for military platforms and land forces. It’s well-established and widely used by American forces, including US Army ground mobile terminals, USN ships and submarines and national command authorities for nuclear forces. It has even found its way into military tactical vehicles as \u2018SATCOM on the move\u2019, enabling functions such as blue force tracking<\/a> (the real time sharing of the location of friendly forces).<\/p>\n In 2007 Australia signed an agreement<\/a> with the US to gain access to WGS. The quid pro quo was that Australia would fund the sixth satellite in the constellation, which was duly launched in 2013<\/a>. The seventh, of an eventual 10<\/a>, was launched a couple of months ago. This sensible arrangement would allow the ADF to access global wideband coverage for a fraction of the cost of establishing its own system and to move away from dependence on commercial providers<\/a>. In return, the US could partially defray the cost of the constellation.<\/p>\n In 2009 the government approved project JP2008 Phase 3F to establish a ground station at Geraldton in Western Australia and to upgrade the facility near Canberra. The work was expected to be completed by 2013<\/a> and cost $94 million. The schedule seemed reasonable given that WGS was already in service with the US, albeit as a work in progress as older ground stations were ‘grandfathered’ into the architecture with a certified end-to-end system still to be achieved. The reality is different, with Australia’s project now planned to deliver five years late<\/a>, meaning that our investment (almost $1 billion<\/a>) will be amortised over a much shorter time than expected. Satellites don\u2019t last forever; sometime next decade a replacement for the WGS constellation\u2014including our own WGS6\u2014will be required, so we\u2019ve already foregone a fair fraction of the usable life of the system.<\/p>\n So how did this happen? We can get a few hints from the reporting of the Projects of Concern listing<\/a>. As the procurement authority, the then-Defence Materiel Organisation was responsible for managing the contract with BAE Systems. DMO suggests that the problem was squarely the contractor’s responsibility, saying that BAE \u2018did not follow its system engineering process [and] sourced components and constructed SGS-W with significant technical non\u2013conformance issues. These issues have been compounded by the Contractor’s lack of expertise with WGS Ground Stations\u2019.<\/p>\n While BAE has clearly underperformed, this project shows that ultimately the risk resides with the Commonwealth as sole customer. No doubt DMO has tried to manage performance, perhaps by refusing to sign off project milestones and even withholding payments (which might explain the reporting of a ‘contractual dispute’ between the parties<\/a>). But at every point, DMO has to decide whether to push on for eventual delivery of a required capability, or to pull the plug and start again with all the delays that entails.<\/p>\n