{"id":22651,"date":"2015-09-25T12:30:04","date_gmt":"2015-09-25T02:30:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=22651"},"modified":"2015-09-25T17:00:54","modified_gmt":"2015-09-25T07:00:54","slug":"indonesia-australia-security-cooperation-defining-common-interests","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indonesia-australia-security-cooperation-defining-common-interests\/","title":{"rendered":"Indonesia\u2013Australia security cooperation: defining common interests"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Australian<\/a>
\n<\/a>Indonesia hosted the Pacific Chiefs of Armies meeting in Bali in mid-September as part of broader US and regional efforts to enhance mutual understanding among countries, and to nudge China to pursue its aspirations within a framework of the mutually accepted norms and rules regulating international relations.<\/p>\n

Both Indonesia and Australia benefit from China\u2019s dynamic economy and its commitment to solving the common problems of mankind, especially in preserving the natural environment, combatting epidemics, curbing transnational crime, and countering terrorism.<\/p>\n

However, there are also unsettling signs that China is escalating the threat and use of force to settle sovereignty disputes. Given the uncertain direction of Chinese policy, no country seeks to foreclose the avenues for China\u2019s peaceful assertion of regional leadership but all aspire to maintain the capacity\u2014either alone or with others\u2014to deter the threat or use of force against their accepted sovereign rights and the established norms of international relations.<\/p>\n

Despite China\u2019s actual and great potential power there are rivals who could in combination restrain its unilateralism if pushed too far. Those include the US, Japan, India, Southeast Asia and Australia. Even current Chinese allies or sympathisers, such as Russia, could change their course if China\u2019s assertiveness against others exposed their vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n

ASEAN is one obvious grouping to provide a counterbalance to China\u2019s assertiveness but its combined weight represents only one third of that of China\u2019s 2014 GDP. Adding the combined weight of Australia and New Zealand makes little difference. Moreover, China\u2019s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea drives a symbolic dagger into the heart Southeast Asia and ASEAN. So while Indonesia is the largest member of ASEAN, representing 43% of its GDP in 2014, and straddles the straits between the Indian and Pacific oceans, it isn\u2019t the undisputed leader of ASEAN. ASEAN is not, and is unlikely to become, a defence alliance. Consequently, any concerted action by ASEAN or part thereof would need external support.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, Indonesia is determined to maintain the formal policy of non-alignment for domestic political reasons. Non-alignment also serves to uphold the unity of ASEAN and maximise Indonesia\u2019s leadership authority within and between ASEAN and its interlocutors. Therefore, unless its sovereignty or other non-negotiable interests are directly threatened, it\u2019s unlikely to seek concrete alliances. Consequently, Indonesia\u2019s strategic associations will be informal, contingent, and temporary\u2014and will give priority to the major powers.<\/p>\n

The core difference between Indonesian and Australian strategy is that Indonesian strategy is based on the ability to resort to guerrilla warfare and protracted struggle should foreign forces invade all or part of the archipelago. Australian strategy at that level of threat is dependent on external support. However, despite their own best efforts, both would need external support for defence against, or liberation from, the threat of invasion.<\/p>\n

Consequently, Australia can be of use in Indonesia\u2019s strategic calculations because:<\/p>\n