{"id":22959,"date":"2015-10-19T11:59:37","date_gmt":"2015-10-19T00:59:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=22959"},"modified":"2015-10-19T11:59:37","modified_gmt":"2015-10-19T00:59:37","slug":"why-the-pla-is-no-paper-tiger-part-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/why-the-pla-is-no-paper-tiger-part-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the PLA is no paper tiger (part 1)"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Paul Dibb recently wrote on The Strategist<\/a><\/em> that China has long-term systemic problems which will prevent its continued rise to Asian great power status, and that as a \u2018brittle state\u2019, China can\u2019t afford to go to war as the risk of failure is too great. But he ignores China\u2019s strategic culture, its history and national identity, all of which strongly influence its policy choices in Indo\u2013Pacific Asia today and into the future, including any decision to go to war, and which also drive its military modernisation process. He then rather unconvincingly characterises China as an isolated power absent friends.<\/p>\n President Xi Jinping promotes the idea of the \u2018China Dream\u2019 which is about restoring China\u2019s traditional, and from its perspective, rightful position as the leading or dominant power in Asia. From a domestic perspective, this demands that China continues to develop and accrue comprehensive national power, but in terms of foreign policy it also demands that China resolve the issue of Taiwan as well as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea in its favour. China is deadly serious when it says that reunification of China and Taiwan must occur on Beijing\u2019s terms, and is equally as serious when it says that the South China Sea belongs to China<\/a>. From Beijing\u2019s perspective, China\u2019s self-declared \u2018nine-dash line\u2019 isn\u2019t negotiable. In the same way, resolving the dispute between China and Japan over the Daioyu\/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea in China\u2019s favour is also a critical interest to Beijing. Those three potential flashpoints involve key allies of the US, and in the case of the South China Sea, raise the critical issue of freedom of navigation of the seas. Therefore any Chinese challenge of the sort now emerging<\/a> in the South China Sea can\u2019t be ignored by Washington either.<\/p>\n When thinking about whether China will go to war, it\u2019s important to look at how China perceives the region and understand how it thinks about Asia\u2019s security challenges. It\u2019s vital to recognise that there\u2019s a strong historical force in China\u2019s perception of the \u2018century of humiliation\u2019 which scars China\u2019s national identity. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exploits both this scar tissue of the century of humiliation and the nationalism within Chinese society to justify and promote its assertive activities in security disputes, and to reinforce its own grip on power. There\u2019s a strong political narrative that not only was the CCP responsible for ending the century of humiliation, but that the CCP that will also rejuvenate China\u2019s greatness and realise the China Dream. The use of historical symbology can\u2019t be ignored; it\u2019s exploitation by the CCP reinforces the idea, as argued by Merriden Varrall, that \u2018history is destiny,\u2019<\/a> and that China regards itself as destined to once again lead Asia. China can\u2019t back down on Taiwan, on the South China Sea or the Diaoyu\/Senkaku islands disputes. To do so would shatter the China Dream, and with it, the CCP\u2019s legitimacy. If challenged, as may occur in the future, particularly in relation to freedom of navigation<\/a> around China\u2019s reclamation activities in the South China Sea, China has vowed not to accept violations of its sovereignty<\/a>. At that point accurate assessments of PLA capabilities will really matter.<\/p>\n Paul goes on to suggest that China has few powerful friends and suffers from deepening strategic isolation. I find this assessment unconvincing given the growing potential for Chinese soft power as it promotes the Silk Road initiatives that will see greater integration between China and its neighbours. The \u2018One Belt, One Road\u2019 initiative is a key element of Chinese grand strategy and peripheral diplomacy that promotes interdependent development between China and its neighbours, and which ties their success to China\u2019s rise. The Silk Road initiatives will open up new markets and ensure that China has access to resources essential to realise the China Dream. In that sense, all roads lead to Beijing to place China once again firmly as a 21st Century Middle Kingdom.<\/p>\n The geopolitics of the Silk Road is important and challenges Paul\u2019s perspective on an isolated China. Chinese investment in its developing neighbours, particularly given that the investment comes with no strings attached to political reform, is such that recipient states won\u2019t want to place Chinese economic largesse at risk. That\u2019s bound to affect their foreign policy calculations in a crisis, raising the prospect of some states remaining neutral or aligning with Beijing<\/a>, rather than with Washington. This raises the prospect that China indeed does have a grand strategy to achieve the China Dream, and in the process reshape the political, economic and security architecture across Asia to restore its traditional leadership role at the expense of the US-led \u2018hub and spokes\u2019 arrangements.<\/p>\n Paul is correct when he says that China can\u2019t tolerate a failure, but I disagree with his interpretation that this would make China timid about going to war. The success of the China Dream isn\u2019t just about domestic economic growth. It\u2019s about China\u2019s return to great power status across Asia, resolving territorial disputes in Maritime East Asia in its favour, preventing US containment by countering the rebalance, and building economic linkages to promote Chinese influence at the expense of the US and its regional allies. China will fight to protect these goals. A second post will examine why Paul\u2019s analysis on PLA weaknesses must be challenged.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Paul Dibb recently wrote on The Strategist that China has long-term systemic problems which will prevent its continued rise to Asian great power status, and that as a \u2018brittle state\u2019, China can\u2019t afford to go …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":22962,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[143,1383,52,1414,471],"class_list":["post-22959","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-asia-pacific","tag-ccp","tag-china","tag-pla","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n