{"id":23070,"date":"2015-10-27T06:00:48","date_gmt":"2015-10-26T19:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=23070"},"modified":"2015-10-26T12:56:19","modified_gmt":"2015-10-26T01:56:19","slug":"too-much-of-a-good-thing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/too-much-of-a-good-thing\/","title":{"rendered":"Too much of a good thing?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n I had the chance last week to give a short presentation at the ADF’s Joint Warfare Conference. As a professional contrarian, I started my contribution with this:<\/p>\n \u2018Jointness is overrated. It’s a concept more valued by military professionals than it\u2019s likely to be by Australian governments deliberating military action. In particular, the joint amphibious capability we\u2019re going to put a lot of effort (and therefore opportunity cost) into developing probably isn\u2019t going to pay dividends commensurate with the cost. Achieving interoperability with allies and partners is a better use of scarce ADF resources than joining up the individual services within it.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n When I say that jointness is overrated, that doesn’t mean that I think it\u2019s not helpful or desirable. Obviously it\u2019s preferable for the ADF\u2019s various force elements to be able to communicate and coordinate their actions. There are low levels of jointness that are routinely useful: reliable communications between force elements and joint logistics to support a regional peacekeeping operation with a deployed joint headquarters, for example.<\/p>\n But in more contested environments jointness involves complex system integration and data fusion to support shared real time situational awareness and activities like cooperative targeting. And that’s costly. Like most military systems, jointness satisfies Augustine’s 7th law<\/a>: ‘the last 10% of the performance sought generates one-third of the cost and two-thirds of the problems’.<\/p>\n So we have to think about the utility of those last few percentage points. The ADF certainly hasn\u2019t needed that level of jointness recently. At the moment, the RAAF’s operating in a coalition air campaign, Navy’s off doing naval things off the coast of Africa and elsewhere, and Army has small deployments in a number of places. In none of those is the ADF delivering a joint effect, apart perhaps from the Army\u2019s occasional use of air transport. We have to go back to the Timor operation in 1999 to see the ADF\u2019s three services operating closely together, and even then it was in relatively benign circumstances. (To be fair, we weren\u2019t sure at the time that things mightn\u2019t heat up.)<\/p>\n Yet there’s aspiration to do much more, especially in amphibious operations. The 2009 and 2013 defence white papers said this:<\/p>\n \u2018The ADF would seek to undertake operations against an adversary\u2019s bases and forces in transit, as far from Australia as possible. This might involve using strike capabilities and the sustained projection of power by joint task forces, including amphibious operations in some circumstances.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Both documents went on to explain that the aim is to produce an amphibious capability suitable for employment across the spectrum of operational activities\u2014 from humanitarian and disaster relief through to power projection. That\u2019s a huge span, and the upper end would require support from the ADF\u2019s most capable combat platforms\u2014fast jets overhead and air warfare destroyers, sea control from surface combatants and submarines, and extensive intelligence support. In short, most of the ADF\u2019s capability would have to be mobilised to support amphibious operations in contested spaces.<\/p>\n