{"id":23386,"date":"2015-11-13T06:00:49","date_gmt":"2015-11-12T19:00:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=23386"},"modified":"2015-11-12T17:37:44","modified_gmt":"2015-11-12T06:37:44","slug":"iraq-lessons-the-impact-of-the-howard-fib","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/iraq-lessons-the-impact-of-the-howard-fib\/","title":{"rendered":"Iraq lessons: the impact of the Howard fib"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Australia played its part in the blunders of the Iraq war by committing early and without questioning the US.<\/p>\n The Howard government claimed to be considering all options, but in reality it closed down consideration. Options weren\u2019t called for. Getting wrong answers to questions posed about Iraq would make it harder for the Prime Minister to take Australia to war.<\/p>\n The previous column<\/a> explored the nature of John Howard\u2019s fib in 2002 and early 2003 about Australia carefully exploring all options, including the option of opting out of an invasion.<\/p>\n The fib was an open secret that had important political benefits and malign policy impacts.<\/p>\n The fib miasma held the government together, sidelined the public service and provided some small political cover as Australian public opinion turned decisively against the looming war.<\/p>\n The politics of Howard\u2019s fib and the way he deployed it was masterful\u2014a virtuoso performance by a determined Prime Minister taking his country into a conflict it didn\u2019t want. If you hanker after strong leadership, see how Howard took Australia to Iraq.<\/p>\n In his autobiography<\/a>, Howard notes that by January 2003\u2014two months before the invasion\u2014a Fairfax poll found only 6% of Australians favoured joining the invasion without UN approval.<\/p>\n In the face of ‘widespread public hesitation’, Howard found the unity of the Liberal and National parties ‘remarkable’. Howard recalls one cabinet meeting late in 2002 when the National Party’s Warren Truss recounts a question from a staunch Party supporter: ‘Can’t we just this once not go along with the Americans?’<\/p>\n This was a question that John Howard worked hard to close down inside Canberra, even as it raged across the country. The Prime Minister knew he was playing for the highest stakes. In his diary in March, 2003, on the eve of war Howard wrote: \u2018I think all of us realise that if this does go \u2018pear-shaped\u2019, then that would be it for me. I should take the rap, for the sake of the party’s future.\u2019<\/p>\n To meet his commitment to George W. Bush and the US alliance, Howard silently put his leadership on the line (a wager he never voiced in public). Such determination has its admirable qualities. But this act of will and power fed the fib miasma that closed down any real thinking about what the Iraq war would mean.<\/p>\n In Canberra, the \u2018open secret\u2019 side of the fib dominated. Options or opinions weren\u2019t sought, much less debated.<\/p>\n As the column on Iraq intelligence<\/a> noted, the Office of National Assessments suddenly changed its judgement on Iraq\u2019s Weapons of Mass Destruction, responding to \u2018policy running strong,\u2019 delivering for the boss.<\/p>\n In the government and bureaucracy, Howard closed down any consideration of options. He needed compliance with the commitment already made to George W. Bush in mid-2002, not dangerous arguments about the perils of what was being planned.<\/p>\n Detailed paperwork coming out of the bureaucracy about the dangers of invasion or the geopolitical consequences of Iraq imploding could be leaked against the government. Any leaks or warnings would weaken the Howard hold on the Coalition parties and further feed public opposition. Simple solution: ensure no such document gets written.<\/p>\n There was no big debate or argument inside the bureaucracy. No big-picture or into-the-future paper was produced on the prospects or the dangers. The role of the public service was to sweat the details: John Howard and the National Security Committee of Cabinet would do the rest. There\u2019s no paper trail leading from the bureaucracy to Cabinet. Howard didn\u2019t ask for it. Thus, he wasn\u2019t given it.<\/p>\n Not asked, the bureaucracy didn\u2019t speak. The submissions to Cabinet, the arguments and pro-and-con documents don\u2019t exist. Howard told Robert Garran<\/a>:<\/p>\n \u00a0\u2018\u2026There was no cabinet submission on the costs and benefits of going to war in Iraq. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was not asked for, and did not offer, any advice on the pros and cons of supporting American intervention.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Underline: no costs and benefits consideration.<\/p>\n