{"id":23392,"date":"2015-11-13T13:29:27","date_gmt":"2015-11-13T02:29:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=23392"},"modified":"2015-11-13T15:05:02","modified_gmt":"2015-11-13T04:05:02","slug":"back-to-the-future-for-the-armys-force-structure-debate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/back-to-the-future-for-the-armys-force-structure-debate\/","title":{"rendered":"Back to the future for the Army\u2019s force structure debate?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n I read with great interest a recent article<\/a> by Paul Dibb titled \u2018How to plan for [an] ADF without [a] territorial threat\u2019. I am of the 1986 Dibb Report<\/a> and subsequent Beazley<\/a> White Paper generation. At Staff College in the early 90\u2019s we pawed over every comma and full stop in those documents looking for some divine guidance. And of course I served in an Army that was very much shaped by those policy tablets.<\/p>\n Professor Dibb\u2019s judgment about Army is dismissively short\u2014just one sentence: \u2018<\/em>it (a maritime strategy) demands a change to Army, with more focus on our Region of direct strategic concern.\u2019 I would have hoped for something better, even allowing for the demands of newspaper editors.<\/p>\n However, it seems in 2015 we are back to the future. Does one conclude from that single sentence that there\u2019s a need for a policy shift or does it suggest that Army\u2019s force structure has been in some way warped by the last 15 years of operations and as a consequence of this apparent retro shift to a maritime strategy needs an urgent re-shape? If so\u2014what?<\/p>\n I thought most defence thinkers in Australia have been talking about a maritime strategy since the early 90\u2019s. Or does it mean that a recalcitrant Army has again failed to digest the critical elements of a maritime strategy and continued to pursue, as I have previously written<\/a>, some heretical \u2018heavy\u2019 armoured force.<\/p>\n Army\u2019s thinking demonstrated in its writing and rhetoric over the last 20 years has been framed around a maritime strategy. What, for heaven\u2019s sake, are the Canberra<\/em>-class LHD ships about if not to operate within and support a maritime strategy?<\/p>\n I fear that Professor Dibb\u2019s article may echo the thoughts of the writers of the White Paper. If that\u2019s so\u2014sadly those who have drafted the policy advice to Government and recommended the consequential force structure priorities have not learned a thing from the last decade or so.<\/p>\n One hopes that the Minister\u2019s recent comments<\/a> which seem to reinforce a \u2018steady as we go\u2019 approach to defence policy isn\u2019t the end of the intellectual investment by the new ministers.<\/p>\n The fundamental question above all is: does the Army\u2019s force structure resulting from the White Paper process align with the Government\u2019s intent and vision for Australia and its role in the world? If the continuous shipbuilding strategy results in an uncritical bias in defence spending which over the forward estimates creates an inherent imbalance in the ADF\u2019s force structure the forthcoming White Paper like the last two should be condemned.<\/p>\n