{"id":23463,"date":"2015-11-23T11:00:13","date_gmt":"2015-11-23T00:00:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=23463"},"modified":"2015-11-19T12:33:35","modified_gmt":"2015-11-19T01:33:35","slug":"colombias-organised-crime-landscape-in-a-post-farc-era","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/colombias-organised-crime-landscape-in-a-post-farc-era\/","title":{"rendered":"Colombia\u2019s organised crime landscape in a post-FARC era"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Several weeks ago on The Strategist<\/em>, I discussed<\/a> why Colombia\u2019s 51-year-old battle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) may come to an end on 23 March 2016. But as negotiations march towards a peace deal, there are five primary reasons why law enforcement agencies may have to hold off on their celebrations a little longer.<\/p>\n First, the eventual demobilisation of FARC rebels wouldn\u2019t be a fatal setback to Colombia\u2019s illicit narcotics industry. Drug lords have been killed or imprisoned only to be replaced quickly, if not immediately, by their lieutenants. In the early 1990s, the end of the big cartels\u2014Medellin and Cali\u2014gave rise to a new breed of smaller, low profile cartels, including the Norte del Valle <\/em>cartel<\/a>.<\/p>\n Second, BACRIM\u2014an acronym from the Spanish Bandas Criminales <\/em>referring to Colombia\u2019s 17 largest organised crime groups\u2014could become a bigger problem. BACRIM emerged in 2003 when the government struck a peace deal with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)\u2014Colombia\u2019s right-wing paramilitaries. The emergence of those groups was the unintended consequence of the then promising demobilisation process. They are now Colombia\u2019s number one national security threat<\/a>.<\/p>\n Third, the National Liberation Army (ELN)\u2014Colombia\u2019s second largest leftist guerrilla group\u2014is still active<\/a>, so it\u2019s possible that factions of FARC could join ELN\u2019s line-up. But that\u2019s unlikely as a peace accord with FARC would take the ideological struggle from the jungle to the Congress. The government expects FARC becomes a political party<\/a> once rebels give-in their weapons. And with FARC off the battlefield, a debilitated ELN may have no choice but to move toward a peace process as well.<\/p>\n Fourth, FARCRIM<\/a>\u2014BACRIM 2.0\u2014could emerge. Those mid-level FARC commanders who are unwilling to embrace a law-abiding life under the peace deal will have sufficient financial incentives to create their own criminal drug running organisations\u2014and stop running drugs for others, including the ruling secretariat negotiators in Havana. And let\u2019s not forget that the revenues that FARC derives from drug trafficking have doubled since 2011<\/a>.<\/p>\n So bluntly speaking, FARC rebels\u2014particularly those unwilling to disarm\u2014face the trilemma of either joining a BACRIM or the ELN, or forming their own FARCRIM. And with Colombia\u2019s illegal narcotics industry providing fertile ground for continued exploitation, it seems that the FARCRIM scenario is the most rational path to take.<\/p>\n Yet under current negotiations, FARC agreed<\/a> to help eradicate the illegal drug trade. Over the last 40 years Colombia\u2019s cocaine business has proven to be extremely resilient. Worryingly, UNODC\u2019s 2015 illicit coca cultivation monitoring survey<\/a> showed Colombia\u2019s cultivation area and production output both increased substantially between 2013 and 2014, growing from 48,000 hectares to 69,000 hectares, and from 290 metric tonnes to 442 metric tonnes respectively.<\/p>\n But even if upon demobilisation FARC rebels didn\u2019t re-engage in the drug trade, a fifth scenario depicts Mexican cartels taking control of Colombia\u2019s narcotics industry. The anti-narcotics directorate of the Colombian Police has warned<\/a> that such a scenario has been slowly unfolding since 2013. Indeed, it has been reported that some FARC commanders are selling-off some of their drug laboratories and other assets to Mexico\u2019s Sinaloa cartel<\/a>, as they try to cash-in before a peace treaty is signed.<\/p>\n Colombian law enforcement agencies are well aware that these five scenarios exist, but the prospects that more than one of them will unfold and combine is more than enough to keep authorities awake at night.<\/p>\n Having FARCRIM, Mexican cartels and BACRIM actively operating in Colombia would only confirm law-enforcement agencies have good reasons to be concerned. While a peace deal with FARC is a positive step, we should be realistic about the likelihood that domestic and international, particularly Mexican, players will rush to fill the power vacuum that a neutered FARC will leave.<\/p>\n FARC runs an enticing and lucrative business that isn\u2019t exclusive to narcotics. Indeed, FARC is one of the world\u2019s richest organised crime\/terrorist organisations.<\/p>\n While estimates vary, Forbes Magazine<\/a> reports FARC\u2019s annual turnover to be US$600 million\u2014behind only ISIS and Hamas. However, that\u2019s significantly less than previous estimates from Colombian officials. In 2013, Colombia\u2019s former head of police said<\/a> that FARC earned as much as US$1 billion. The year before, Former Defense Minister, Juan Carlos Pinzon said<\/a> that FARC\u2019s net annual revenue should range from US$2.4 billion to US$3.5 billion. However, Pinzon\u2019s estimate only included revenues derived from cocaine production and processing, as well as a \u2018tax\u2019 charged on growers and traffickers operating in FARC\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n Illegal mining\u2014particularly gold\u2014is FARC\u2019s second largest revenue source. Yet it\u2019s still unknown how much of the US$4 billion dollar business<\/a> feeds FARC coffers. Illegal mines are present in over 20% percent of Colombia\u2019s municipalities, affecting over 16,784 hectares of land. Unsurprisingly, in July this year, President Juan Manuel Santos declared war against illegal mining<\/a>.<\/p>\n FARC has also muscled their way into kidnapping for ransom and extortion. In 2003, the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIAF) revealed<\/a> \u00a0that kidnapping represented annual earnings of US$37 million for FARC, while more recent estimates suggest that FARC receives around 10% of the estimated US$1 billion per year earned from extortion in Colombia<\/a>.<\/p>\n Other criminal activities include a US$5 million cattle rustling business<\/a>, oil and bank robberies, land appropriation for agricultural exploitation, fa\u00e7ade companies, financial investment\u2019s returns and the list continues.<\/p>\n FARC\u2019s estimated fortune accounts for a significant portion of Colombia\u2019s US$14 billion organised crime industry<\/a>, and also an annual money-laundering operation that is equivalent to over 3% of Colombia\u2019s Gross Domestic P<\/a>roduct.<\/p>\n The breadth and depth of the organised crime problem FARC could inherit threatens to spoil the peace-building process in Colombia. So while reaching a peace agreement is a monumental task in and of itself, maintaining that peace will be much harder if an organised crime boom takes place.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Several weeks ago on The Strategist, I discussed why Colombia\u2019s 51-year-old battle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) may come to an end on 23 March 2016. But as negotiations march towards a …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":292,"featured_media":23464,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1514,1082,1515,1553],"class_list":["post-23463","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-colombia","tag-drugs","tag-farc","tag-south-america"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n