{"id":23542,"date":"2015-11-24T14:30:05","date_gmt":"2015-11-24T03:30:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=23542"},"modified":"2015-11-24T09:39:16","modified_gmt":"2015-11-23T22:39:16","slug":"australia-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia and the South China Sea dispute"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Mark Thomson and I were in Tokyo earlier this month as part of an annual exchange ASPI has with the National Institute for Defense Studies<\/a>. The two organisations have been doing exchanges for over a decade, and it\u2019s been interesting to see how the topics of discussion have evolved in parallel to the security relationship between our two countries. There\u2019s always a lot to cover, but this time around the three main topics were submarines, the South China Sea (SCS) and Australia\u2019s leadership change (specifically, what it might mean for security policy).<\/p>\n No surprises there. Subs were always going to be near the top of the list with the Competitive Evaluation Process<\/a> closing this month. The SCS has pretty much every security analyst in the hemisphere engaged. And the change of PM here in Australia could conceivably have a bearing on how we as a country handle both of those issues. With Mark having posted on the submarines<\/a> I thought it was worth summarising what I had to say on the other issues. (My complete presentation is here<\/a>.)<\/p>\n My assessment\u2014which I don\u2019t think is controversial\u2014is that so far there\u2019s more continuity than difference in Australia\u2019s public position on regional security in general, and the SCS in particular since Mr Turnbull replaced Mr Abbott. There was some speculation in Australia that his thinking on China is more positive than Abbott\u2019s and that those views might carry over to national security<\/a>. However, in his first substantial interview as Prime Minister<\/a>, Mr Turnbull said this about China\u2019s SCS activities:<\/p>\n \u2018\u2026we need to ensure is that the rise of China [is] conducted in a manner that does not disturb the security and the relative harmony of the region upon which China’s prosperity depends. Now \u2013 now, that requires careful diplomacy, it requires balancing. China would be better advised in its own interests, frankly, to \u2013 not to be pushing the envelope, and that is why there’s been resistance against that activity. I think their foreign policy in the South China Sea has been quite counterproductive.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Since then, those sentiments have been echoed by the Foreign Minister, and in speeches by the new Defence Minister<\/a>. As well, Australia has been a vocal supporter of \u2018freedom of navigation\u2019 exercises by the US, and has agreed to increase naval cooperation with the USN<\/a>, including additional exercises. The communiqu\u00e9 from this year\u2019s AUSMIN consultations<\/a> included this:<\/p>\n \u2018[The parties] expressed strong concerns over recent Chinese land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea. They called on all claimant states to halt land reclamation, construction, and militarization. They urged claimants to exercise restraint, take steps to ease tensions and refrain from provocative actions that could escalate tensions.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n It remains to be seen what steps beyond rhetoric Australia is prepared to take in support of US activities to assert \u2018freedom of navigation\u2019. There have been suggestions that Australia should conduct a similar operation. One such came from former Foreign Minister<\/a> Gareth Evans. Representing the opposing school of thought is another former Foreign Minister in Bob Carr<\/a>. On the Liberal side, I think it\u2019s fair to say that former Prime Minister Abbott might have found a freedom of navigation exercise appealing. Mr Turnbull might take a different view, but we can\u2019t yet be sure.<\/p>\n Some worry that Australia faces a potentially damaging backlash from China if we push on the SCS issue. I\u2019m not so sure. When China declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea, Australia was a vocal critic, and the Foreign Minister had the Chinese ambassador to Australia summoned for a formal communication of Australia\u2019s disapproval<\/a>. Australia also warned that it would also object to any future ADIZ declaration in the SCS<\/a>. Australia\u2019s position drew a strident response from China, which described it as \u2018irresponsible and mistaken<\/a>\u2019 and added that Australia should \u2018immediately correct its mistake, so as to avoid damaging China\u2013Australia relations\u2019.<\/p>\n Australia didn\u2019t withdraw its criticism, and there were no visible consequences as a result. In fact, since then, the Australian and Chinese navies have just conducted their second live fire exercise<\/a> and the two countries have negotiated a free trade agreement<\/a>. That suggests that assertions of our strategic interests don\u2019t carry the downside risk that\u2019s sometimes argued\u2014Mark was probably right when he observed<\/a> that China has less leverage over Australia than is often thought. But following Australia\u2019s support of recent USN activity, China is following its usual script of telling Australia following the US example will \u2018only bring trouble<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n Australia will need to decide what it\u2019s prepared to do, so Mr Turnbull and his National Security Committee have to form a position on this issue that attempts to preserve our strategic interests against encroachment. They\u2019ll also need contingency plans in case of a crisis\u2014another EP-3 like incident<\/a> (PDF) could warm things up quickly.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Mark Thomson and I were in Tokyo earlier this month as part of an annual exchange ASPI has with the National Institute for Defense Studies. The two organisations have been doing exchanges for over a …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":23545,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1056,52,135,471],"class_list":["post-23542","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-bilateral-relations","tag-china","tag-japan","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n