a report<\/a> tabled in Parliament in December 2014, 87% of the schedule slippage was in projects approved before 2007.<\/p>\nBut we also we have seen the tensions with Defence over financial control and budgeting. The DMO also failed, in most cases, to attract commercial talent. We\u2019ve seen unnecessary layers of management develop.<\/p>\n
The ultimate sin was that the DMO was unable to consistently provide real contestability around acquisition strategies or industrial realities. That led to many poor acquisition outcomes.<\/p>\n
It was unsustainable for DMO to be structured as it was before the Peever review. It had to be either fully out of Defence or fully within Defence.<\/p>\n
However, risks arise from the abolition of the DMO and CDG. First, the risks are around contestability. I have concerns about whether the Policy and Intelligence Group will be able to provide the genuine contestability to challenge the capability definitions process being driven by the service chiefs. It isn\u2019t just about rigorously defining military capabilities. It\u2019s about providing truly independent advice on the financial, technical, industrial and economic implications of certain capability options being developed.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s also a risk in replacing CDG and DMO while we are undertaking acquisitions of submarines, future frigates and LAND 400 vehicles. To effectively abolish the CDG and the DMO while developing projects that cumulatively will cost more than $80 billion is a high risk indeed.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s also a risk that capability managers will specify narrow needs and timelines to game the system. This leads to a lack of real contestability, risk reduction and lack of focus on Australian options.<\/p>\n
I saw an example firsthand, which was around LAND 121 Phase 4. Some parts of the Defence Organisation had their hearts set on the developmental US Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and they specified timelines, processes and requirements that effectively ruled out almost every other option. It was only because of real leadership within the Labor Government at the time, driven by Greg Combet, that we saw an Australian option kept on the table.<\/p>\n
In the end the Australian option was chosen ahead of the US option. It is more suited to our needs and will secure hundreds of Australian jobs. This is an example of the risk of giving too much power to one part of Defence without having true contestability.<\/p>\n
The First Principles recommendation to abolish the DMO and CDG may pay off. It may lead to a truly integrated defence organisation with improved procurement. But the risks are considerable. What happens if true contestability is lost? What happens if there is less focus on commercial reality?<\/p>\n
One Defence may be created, but what sort of Defence will it be?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
From trying to install 21st century avionics on 1960s helicopters to buying landing craft that crack and can\u2019t fit onto their motherships, defence procurement in Australia has been fraught. Within this context David Peever\u2019s First …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":448,"featured_media":23700,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,112,1129],"class_list":["post-23698","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-defence-materiel-organisation","tag-first-principles-review"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
The First Principles Review\u2014One Defence, but at what cost? | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n