{"id":23814,"date":"2015-12-10T06:00:35","date_gmt":"2015-12-09T19:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=23814"},"modified":"2015-12-08T10:54:02","modified_gmt":"2015-12-07T23:54:02","slug":"debating-ground-forces-against-daesh-does-the-fight-against-al-shabaab-offer-any-insights","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/debating-ground-forces-against-daesh-does-the-fight-against-al-shabaab-offer-any-insights\/","title":{"rendered":"Debating ground forces against Daesh: does the fight against Al-Shabaab offer any insights?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris, we\u2019ve seen a reinvigorated debate<\/a> about \u2018boots on the ground\u2019 in the fight against daesh<\/em>, and the US is slowly edging towards greater ground operations<\/a> in Iraq and Syria. The debate has so far offered little reflection on the lessons that can be drawn from other theatres in the current (as opposed to historical) fight against Jihadi insurgencies. Somalia\u2019s fight against Al-Shabaab (AS) appears to represent a good example of the difference ground troops can make in fighting insurgency, so what can it teach us with regards to daesh<\/em>?<\/p>\n It\u2019s important to establish that there are significant differences in the cultural, historical, economic, and socio-political context between Iraq and Syria, and Somalia. Their respective Jihadi insurgencies are also different; daesh<\/em> is much wealthier and greater in strength of numbers and military hardware than AS ever was.<\/p>\n However, there are similarities in the trajectories of insurgency groups which establish themselves as governance structures. Simply put, once such groups start administrating and governing a territory, resources, and a population, they can follow similar paths of development.<\/p>\n Take for example the resources that to a large extent fund AS and daesh<\/em>\u2019s governance. Although charcoal (AS) and oil (daesh<\/em>) have different origins, production processes, and properties, they\u2019ve been exploited and administrated in a similar fashion. Both charcoal in Somalia, and oil in Syria and Iraq have throughout these insurgencies been successfully produced, taxed, and transported, notwithstanding international sanctions and efforts to stem their trade. And all of that has been done mostly by civilians and local businessmen who aren\u2019t necessarily \u2018aligned\u2019 to, or formal members of the two organisations. Most of them would trade in those resources regardless of who governs; life\u2014as they say\u2014must go on.<\/p>\n In Somalia, the African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) troops have been fighting a largely militarily successful offensive against AS since mid-2012 and have in the past three years gained nominal control of most of AS\u2019 major urban strongholds. Because AMISOM troops are more heavily armed than AS, the group has for the most part avoided head-on confrontations. Daesh certainly appears better equipped than AS but it\u2019s conceivable that a well-armed ground force supported by airstrikes (which AMISOM doesn\u2019t have) would be successful in dispensing with daesh<\/em> in head-on conventional battles.<\/p>\n But what happens next? As the example of Somalia has clearly shown, once the military part of the operation is done, the supporting social services and policing are key for gaining, and maintaining the support of the local population. This in turn should help further fight and marginalise the insurgency by denying it local support. However, those capacities are weak in Somalia, hence Al-Shabaab\u2019s consistent ability to infiltrate state security structures and continue mounting devastating attacks in areas nominally under AMISOM control (including the capital Mogadishu).<\/p>\n That\u2019s directly relevant to the ground troop fight against daesh<\/em>. Is there a capacity within Iraq or Syria for those supporting services once daesh<\/em> is nominally no longer in control of major urban strongholds? Simply put, what will come after the expected victorious military ground offensives against daesh<\/em>, and how will it help gain the trust of the locals and foster inclusive governance which would serve as a bulwark against the organisation\u2019s resurgence?<\/p>\n