{"id":24212,"date":"2016-01-27T06:00:01","date_gmt":"2016-01-26T19:00:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=24212"},"modified":"2016-01-25T09:59:22","modified_gmt":"2016-01-24T22:59:22","slug":"defeat-the-islamic-state-fuel-a-jihadist-spring","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/defeat-the-islamic-state-fuel-a-jihadist-spring\/","title":{"rendered":"Defeat the Islamic State, fuel a Jihadist Spring?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Mosul\"<\/a><\/p>\n

When the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, demonstrations in support of political freedoms, anti-corruption measures and democratic governance were met brutally by the Assad regime. Having interviewed<\/a> dozens of Syrians who were part of those early protests, I was told that Islamist elements were typically met with suspicion, if not derision, by demonstrators who felt that Islamism contradicted the values and goals of \u2018our revolution\u2019. Fast forward to 2016 and the war for Syria is dominated by a complex and heterogeneous array of Sunni (as well as Shia) militant Islamist groups. Syria\u2019s Arab Spring now looks more like a Jihadist Spring.<\/p>\n

Drawing linear causal links between Syria\u2019s failed Arab Spring and the now flourishing Jihadist Spring crudely ignores a complicated mix of closely interconnected factors. The Free Syrian Army\u2019s inability to unite disparate rebel groups, the self-interest driven intervention of Middle Eastern states, the hesitancy of western powers to intervene, and Syria\u2019s unique status in Islamic prophecies and long history of jihadist networks all contributed (along with many other factors) to the Levant\u2019s current malaise. Islamic State (IS) emerged by leveraging those dynamics but they also played a fundamental role in shaping them.<\/p>\n

Beyond the Levant, the Jihadist Spring looks like a global phenomenon and IS is a significant player in those dynamics too. As in the Levant, IS takes advantage of the perceived failings of not just weak state authorities but other Islamist groups to present themselves as the only viable source of solutions for societies in acute crisis. The practicalities of IS\u2019s transnational expansion has seen them leverage intra-organisational fissures in established Islamist movements to attract breakaway factions (e.g. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to Wilayat Khurasan) and co-opt established groups (e.g. Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah). IS\u2019s transnational wilayats <\/em>have more than just a symbolic tie to IS run out of Raqqa\u2014they also adopt IS\u2019s strategic playbook. That in turn puts pressure on other Islamists to out-compete IS for popular support.<\/p>\n

Consequently, IS is fundamentally shaping the strategic dynamics of the Jihadist Spring. IS\u2019s campaign strategy is geared towards exacerbating its strengths and hiding its weaknesses. It appears state-like in its areas of control, more like a guerrilla force outside of those areas and a terrorist network on the peripheries of its reach. Moreover, IS engages in \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 and even \u2018hybrid governance\u2019 where circumstances require while using propaganda as a \u2018force multiplier\u2019 for itself and a \u2018force nullifier\u2019 against opponents. It\u2019s a politico-military campaign<\/a> that inspires mimicry from friends and forces reaction from foes.<\/p>\n

Two examples highlight the latter. According to many Syrian opposition elements I\u2019ve interviewed, Jabhat Al-Nusrah\u2019s rise as one of the most dominant rebel groups in Syria has been largely due to it abandoning a more gradualist governance strategy and replacing it, in response to IS\u2019s blitz approach, with a careful but more rapidly implemented ground strategy headed by locals. Meanwhile, the Taliban\u2019s recent resurgence in Afghanistan and the strategies it\u2019s deployed have been driven, to varying degrees, by the \u2018competition\u2019 provided by IS\u2019s Wilayat Khurasan.<\/p>\n

IS\u2019s propaganda efforts are also fuelling developments in the strategic communications campaigns of affiliates and rivals. In a recent analysis<\/a> of the strategic logic of IS propaganda, the group\u2019s counter-narrative strategy emerged as a central component of IS\u2019s efforts to win supporters away from other Sunni groups. The resulting \u2018propaganda war\u2019 within<\/em> Sunni militant Islamist circles has fuelled a race to produce messaging that innovatively weaves eye-catching imagery and powerful symbolism with rich narratives that play upon an array of rational and identity choice appeals. For instance, in response to an IS video showing the execution of its members, Jaysh Al-Islam produced a 20 minute long video which ended with the execution of captured IS fighters by men dressed in orange jumpsuits as a symbolic reversal of the IS film. Having struggled to respond to al-Qaeda and now IS\u2019s propaganda campaigns, western governments can be sure that future threats will be even more challenging.<\/p>\n

Despite a year of extraordinary military and financial pressures and significant territorial losses<\/a>, IS remain in control of Raqqa and Mosul while foreign fighters traveling to the caliphate have reportedly<\/a> doubled. Perhaps more troubling is that IS wilayats <\/em>have emerged across the Middle East, Africa and Asia while IS-inspired terrorist plots in the west have security apparatuses scrambling. However, combating IS but ignoring the broader Jihadist Spring is obsessing over the battle and forgetting the war. Such is the complexity of the phenomenon we confront, damaging IS or even inflicting defeats on IS or its wilayats<\/em> will merely create vacuums of meaning and control<\/a> for surviving IS elements, breakaway factions or rivals to emerge and compete for influence.<\/p>\n

Understanding the intricacies of the Jihadist Spring\u2014both its macro-transnational and micro-societal dynamics\u2014is merely the first step in devising counter-strategies that will have not only productive first order effects but valuable second and third order effects too. There\u2019s a long way to go.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

When the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, demonstrations in support of political freedoms, anti-corruption measures and democratic governance were met brutally by the Assad regime. Having interviewed dozens of Syrians who were part of …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":272,"featured_media":24342,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[581,837,895,1106,274],"class_list":["post-24212","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-arab-spring","tag-isis","tag-islamic-state","tag-jihadism","tag-syria"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDefeat the Islamic State, fuel a Jihadist Spring? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/defeat-the-islamic-state-fuel-a-jihadist-spring\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Defeat the Islamic State, fuel a Jihadist Spring? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"When the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, demonstrations in support of political freedoms, anti-corruption measures and democratic governance were met brutally by the Assad regime. 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