{"id":24471,"date":"2016-02-04T06:00:36","date_gmt":"2016-02-03T19:00:36","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=24471"},"modified":"2022-03-18T10:34:42","modified_gmt":"2022-03-17T23:34:42","slug":"the-dividing-trench-indonesias-offshore-resource-development","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-dividing-trench-indonesias-offshore-resource-development\/","title":{"rendered":"The dividing trench: Indonesia\u2019s offshore resource development"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Australians will notice an interesting parallel between oil giant Woodside and its impasse with the Timor Leste government and an internal conflict within the Joko Widodo administration over how to develop what will be Indonesia\u2019s biggest producing gasfield in the Arafura Sea.<\/p>\n The common denominator for both is a 2,500\u20133,000-metre-deep undersea trench, part of the earthquake-prone Indian Ocean fault line that skirts Sumatra and Java and curls around the coast of eastern Indonesia\u2019s Nusa Tenggara island chain.<\/p>\n Marking the convergence of the Indo-Australian and Eurasian tectonic plates, the Timor trench<\/a> is one reason for Woodside\u2019s adamant refusal to pipe gas from its Sunrise field to Timor Leste, despite all the benefits that would bring the tiny island republic.<\/p>\n The company last year shelved plans<\/a> to develop the 5.1 trillion cubic foot Sunrise field in the Australia\u2013Timor Leste Joint Petroleum Development Zone after giving Dili an ultimatum to either accept floating LNG technology or leave the gas in the ground.<\/p>\n Hard up against the maritime boundary with Australia, about 400 km northeast of the Sunrise field, the Masela block has the same issue<\/a>.<\/p>\n After acquiring 100% of the Masela exploration concession in 1998, Japan\u2019s Inpex Corporation drilled six appraisal wells between 2002 and 2007 that showed the Abadi field located in the Masela block contained at least 9 trillion cubic feet. Given the remote location, that still made it a marginal proposition.<\/p>\n Authorities approved an initial development plan in late 2010 calling for a 2.5 million tonne floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal. But with Shell joining the venture in 2013 further drilling saw proven reserves climb to 12.4 trillion cubic feet, with confident\u00a0expectations it will grow to more than 40 trillion cubic feet.<\/p>\n That\u2019s three times more than BP\u2019s Tangguh operation<\/a> in West Papua\u2019s Bintuni Bay, of which Inpex is a 7.7% stakeholder; Tangguh was recently given approval to expand from two to three onshore production trains.<\/p>\n Only the Natuna D-Alpha field in the South China Sea is bigger, at 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves, but the huge volumes of associated CO2 have deterred its development since the early 1970s\u2014and will continue to do so.<\/p>\n Commercially, it would have made sense to pump the Abadi gas through a 400-kilometre pipeline to Darwin\u2019s LNG processing terminal, an idea Inpex initially broached with Jakarta when the real size of the field became clear.<\/p>\n Politically, that was never on the cards. As one analyst exclaimed: \u2018Indonesian gas going into Darwin? Never!\u2019 But it became a lot more complicated when President Joko Widodo brought in Rizal Ramli as maritime coordinating minister in an August 2015 Cabinet reshuffle.<\/p>\n An avowed resource nationalist, Ramli questioned why regulator, SSKMigas, and Mines and Energy Minister, Sudirman Said, had approved a revised Inpex development plan<\/a> which increases the capacity of a proposed floating gas terminal from 2.5 million tonnes to 7.5 million tonnes.<\/p>\n Anxious to find more ways to boost the eastern Indonesian economy, Ramli insisted the gas should instead be piped to a proposed onshore terminal in the remote Tanimbar Islands, 170 kilometres to the northeast of Masela.<\/p>\n