<\/a><\/p>\nA wide brown land needs a big, big defence policy and Australia has received that very thing with this morning\u2019s delivery of the 2016 Defence White Paper.<\/span><\/p>\nConceived in 2013, gestating like a humongous pearl in 2014 and 2015, the 2016 White Paper largely lives up to its self-made claim to be \u2018deliberate, rigorous and methodical\u2019. Although a close read occasionally points to the White Paper\u2019s mixed parentage\u2014the words \u2018agile\u2019 and \u2018innovative\u2019 are salted through the text\u2014this is a document that sets out a clear strategy, a logically-articulated force structure and\u2014can you believe it\u2014a plausible funding plan.<\/span><\/p>\nThe strategy all hinges on the money. To the extent that any government can commit their heirs and successors, this White Paper locks in a promise to reach a defence budget \u2018just ahead\u2019 of 2% of gross domestic product in 2020\u201321. That\u2019s three\u00a0years in advance of Tony Abbott\u2019s pledge to reach 2% of GDP in 2023\u201324. Some decry the value of the 2% target, but it kept both Government and Opposition focused on security at a time when others would have happily ditched the spending promise.<\/span><\/p>\nOn strategic outlook, the White Paper makes a compelling case for being concerned about a generally deteriorating situation. It does so after a throat-clearing reference to the \u2018greater opportunities for prosperity and development\u2019 afforded by generally exciting times. But opportunities for positive excitement can only be realised if prosperity stays underpinned by peace and stability.<\/span><\/p>\nThe risks are elaborated: cyber attacks are \u2018a real and present threat\u2019; there will be \u2018greater uncertainty\u2019 for at least the next two decades; serious \u2018points of friction\u2019 are emerging between China and the US; Russia emerges increasingly \u2018coercive and aggressive\u2019; terrorism is growing and regional countries aren\u2019t well placed to handle it; the South China Sea \u2018will continue to provide a source of tension that could undermine stability\u2019; and so on.<\/span><\/p>\nThe list of risks isn\u2019t exaggerated and they cumulatively point to the need for a stronger set of military capabilities and an Australian Defence Force more engaged in Indo\u2013Pacific regional security cooperation. (Upcoming posts on <\/span>The Strategist<\/span><\/i> will look in detail at capability choices.)<\/span><\/p>\nHere it\u2019s worth noting that the 2016 White Paper makes more of Defence \u2018posture\u2019 than any of its predecessors. \u2018Posture\u2019 in this sense means what you do with the Defence Force you already have. That\u2019s the real start of planning for the defence force we would like to have and might get if funding assumptions hold.<\/span><\/p>\nThree \u2018Strategic Defence Interests\u2019 are said to shape policy decisions. These are: one, having the capacity to deter or defeat any attack on, or attempt to coerce, Australia. Two, securing our nearer region of \u2018maritime Southeast Asia\u2019 and the Pacific; and three, contributing to a stable Indo\u2013Pacific region and a rules-based global order.<\/span><\/p>\nFundamentally it\u2019s the second of those priorities that drives key posture and future force structure decision-making. The White Paper can be seen as the concluding verse to the generation-long saga of the Defence of Australia (DOA) strategy. \u2018DOA\u2019 is now fully effected in a maritime strategy focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific.<\/span><\/p>\nDefence\u2019s international engagement effort is projected to grow renewed priority for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. ADF readiness levels are to be raised to allow for a more sustained ADF presence in the region\u2014a potentially expensive decision. The numbers of ADF and Defence civilian personnel posted overseas will increase, but there are few details about how that will be done.<\/span><\/p>\nAlmost every major relationship in the Indo\u2013Pacific is projected to grow. The document is bullish on prospects for cooperation with Indonesia. Areas identified for more cooperation include counterterrorism, maritime engagement, HADR, peacekeeping and intelligence. Interestingly, the White Paper refers to the modernisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces as a \u2018positive development\u2019 in regional security and anticipates that Australia could support that process.<\/span><\/p>\nThe paragraphs on Japan show how far the bilateral relationship has come even before any final decision is made on the preferred submarine design. Identified areas for cooperation include intelligence, developing common capabilities like the Joint Strike Fighter, air and missile defence and maritime warfare technologies. It\u2019s perhaps not unconnected with a statement in the section on missile defence which says that Australia will participate in a bilateral working group with the US to examine \u2018options for potential Australian contributions to integrated air and missile defence in the region\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\nOn China, the White Paper is measured and restrained. It talks rather soberly of the \u2018productive working relationship\u2019 on Defence matters and stresses in several places that China has an opportunity to step forward to play its own role in regional peace and stability in \u2018North Asia and the Indo\u2013Pacific.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\nThe Paper is concerned about the South China Sea becoming a source of tension that could undermine stability. It pointedly says that \u2018Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China\u2019s land reclamation activities\u2019. It pronounces that countries should be \u2018open and transparent about end-state purposes of land reclamation activities\u2019. Well, a White Paper would have to say something like that, wouldn\u2019t it? The \u2018end state purposes\u2019 of China\u2019s activities in the South China Sea are pretty obvious, even to the half-blind dugongs that might once have swum around Mischief Reef.<\/span><\/p>\nAlthough Tony Abbott\u2019s rhetorical flourish of the \u2018long, strong arm\u2019 of the ADF is behind us, the White Paper preserves a welcome commitment to thinking about Australian strategic interests on a global canvas. Apart from the US, New Zealand and the Pacific, the section on engagement also highlights Australia\u2019s productive defence links with the UK, NATO, the UN, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany. This is a welcome change and points to a growing maturity around the thought that Australia can do the strategic equivalent of walking and chewing gum. When it comes to defence thinking we can be both global and local\u2014a skill demanded of us by our increasingly risky strategic environment.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"A wide brown land needs a big, big defence policy and Australia has received that very thing with this morning\u2019s delivery of the 2016 Defence White Paper. Conceived in 2013, gestating like a humongous pearl …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":24816,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,143,713,1636,71],"class_list":["post-24814","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-asia-pacific","tag-cyberattack","tag-defence-white-paper-2016","tag-maritime-security"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
The 2016 Defence White Paper: good posture | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n