<\/a>After two prime ministers, three defence ministers, three assistant defence ministers and two parliamentary secretaries\u2014and a 12 month delay\u2014we welcome today\u2019s release of the Defence White Paper.<\/p>\nWe also support the Government\u2019s decision to deliver on its promise of Defence funding to 2% of GDP. This keeps faith with Labor\u2019s commitment for 2%, and Bill Shorten\u2019s commitment to support any realistic and practical proposal to achieve that target.<\/span><\/p>\nThe Turnbull Government is now telling Australians that it intends to support the acquisition of twelve Future Submarines.<\/span><\/p>\nIt\u2019s been a tortured road. In 2013, then-Opposition Leader, Tony Abbott, pledged to support Labor\u2019s resolve to build an expanded submarine fleet, and to build it in Adelaide. If the Liberal Government had stopped there, they would have saved all of us a lot of pain and unnecessary costs.<\/span><\/p>\nInstead, in early 2014 the Liberal Government began exploring \u2018Option J\u2019, the acquisition of our Future Submarines from Japan. Tony Abbott\u2019s \u2018Captain\u2019s Call\u2019, suspected to be a result of discussions between him and Japan\u2019s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, meant breaking another election commitment, and abandoning the Australian submarine enterprise, which has been centred in Adelaide since the 1980s.<\/span><\/p>\nThe Liberal Government\u2019s contention that Australia lacked the skills to build a capable and cost-effective future submarine were steadily debunked over 2014. Senate inquiries, expert witnesses, industry and veteran submariners all succeeded in embarrassing the government again and again, pointing out the need for a competitive tender process, establishing that a competitive tender process doesn\u2019t mean a capability gap (thereby debunking Treasurer Hockey\u2019s contention), highlighting the economic benefits of a build in Australia, and proving that there were no proven submarine designs available on the international market that could meet Australia\u2019s needs.<\/span><\/p>\nThe \u2018submarine issue\u2019 was hurting Tony Abbott and the Government.<\/span><\/p>\nOn 11 February 2015, in the context of a leadership challenge, Tony Abbott invented the Competitive Evaluation Process, a process hitherto unknown to Defence. The CEP announcement secured the support of SA backbenchers for Abbott in the party room.<\/span><\/p>\nThe fact that Australia\u2019s largest ever Defence acquisition found itself being bandied around in factional negotiations is an enduring scandal.<\/span><\/p>\nToday, the CEP is a year old. Much of it is secret. The CEP sought formal proposals from TKMS of Germany, DCNS of France, and the Government of Japan. In an inexplicable and punitive act, Kockums of Sweden was excluded.<\/span><\/p>\nBecause the CEP was a \u2018political fix\u2019 rather than a bona fide process, it has attracted criticism. It isn\u2019t a suitable process for making a well-informed commercial selection. Because the CEP is designed to make a choice of supplier now, it eliminates competitive pressure before a design has been developed, let alone finalised. If the Government plans to sign a production contract three years after selecting a preferred designer then it exposes Defence to enormous risks. The Commonwealth will either have to pay whatever the designer wants\u2014or start the process again. The CEP doesn\u2019t enable the Commonwealth to control price.<\/span><\/p>\nWarren King, former CEO of the Defence Materiel Organisation, opined on 8 October 2015 that the Commonwealth should retain competitive pressure in the CEP process by selecting two preferred designers, rather than one. Such a decision wouldn\u2019t add to the length of the process (and hence can\u2019t be accused of creating a likelihood of a \u2018capability gap\u2019):<\/span><\/p>\n\u2018To rush the start of the project in order to meet what’s perceived to be immediate jobs \u2014 against the opportunity to create a competent, capable, efficient industry \u2014 that can go on functioning for decades and decades needs to be balanced out.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\nFurther, Mr King told <\/span>The Australian<\/span><\/i> that the three contenders to \u00addesign the new submarines hadn\u2019t been given nearly enough to time to present considered and detailed proposals and this presented enormous risks to the project in the years ahead.<\/span><\/p>\nThe CEP is really about choosing our submarine marriage partner for the next half century (some would argue that we did that when we chose Sweden and the Collins-class last century). If we down select to one partner nation at the end of what\u2019s a very short competitive evaluation process, a process that won\u2019t deliver all that much in the way of verifiable performance, then competitive tension thereafter won\u2019t be possible.<\/span><\/p>\nMight it not be better instead, rather than choosing a single winner in mid-2016 before real work even begins on the submarine design, to down select to two finalists and take both into the concept design phase? That approach could save hundreds of millions of dollars in the longer term, possibly billions in whole of life costs.<\/span><\/p>\nThe announcement that the Government is now seeking twelve submarines is yet another blow for the already flawed CEP process. That\u2019s because the Abbott Government required TKMS, DCNS and Japan to bid for eight submarines, not twelve. All of the work undertaken by those contenders for the Future Submarine\u2014data on construction location choices (with options for overseas, Australian, and hybrid construction plans) and Australian Industry plans\u2014have now all been rendered obsolete by the changed requirement for twelve, not eight.<\/span><\/p>\nThe fact is that the requirement for twelve strengthens the case for building the submarines in Adelaide. And twelve rather than eight will transform the production schedule, the Navy\u2019s manning requirements and training obligation, and much more besides. Twelve submarines is the minimum-sized force to enable a continuous build strategy, but the bidders haven\u2019t been asked to contemplate that, making obsolete many of the assumptions that will underpin their bids.<\/span><\/p>\nIt\u2019s yet another failure in what has been a trying few years for Defence\u2014with three Defence Ministers, three Assistant Defence Ministers and two Parliamentary Secretaries, and a Defence White Paper that\u2019s now a year late. There hasn\u2019t been a Defence Industry Policy Statement or updated Capability Plan since the change of Government in 2013. This has resulted in the loss of over fifteen hundred shipbuilding jobs across Australia.<\/span><\/p>\nThe decision to build twelve submarines is the right decision for Australia, just as it was right when it was announced in 2009.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"After two prime ministers, three defence ministers, three assistant defence ministers and two parliamentary secretaries\u2014and a 12 month delay\u2014we welcome today\u2019s release of the Defence White Paper. We also support the Government\u2019s decision to deliver …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":328,"featured_media":24863,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,1636,1051,579],"class_list":["post-24853","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-defence-white-paper-2016","tag-future-submarine-project","tag-shipbuilding"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Twelve Future Submarines: a long, circuitous journey | The Strategist<\/title>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n