{"id":24936,"date":"2016-02-29T11:26:37","date_gmt":"2016-02-29T00:26:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=24936"},"modified":"2016-02-29T12:02:03","modified_gmt":"2016-02-29T01:02:03","slug":"a-chronic-optimist-takes-on-syria-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/a-chronic-optimist-takes-on-syria-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Staffan de Mistura: a \u2018chronic optimist\u2019 takes on Syria (part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura\u2019s background and leadership style (<\/span>see part 1<\/span><\/a>) have influenced his approach to the Syrian conflict from the day UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asked him to take on the role. When he got the call in July 2014, de Mistura was enjoying a lovely semi-retirement on the isle of Capri after promising his fianc\u00e9e and two daughters (from a previous marriage) a \u2018more normal life\u2019 after nearly four decades of bouncing between war zones. De Mistura was inclined to say no, but as he tried to sleep that night, he felt guilty. Ban\u2019s words about the numbers of civilians killed and the refugees echoed in his head. He<\/span> called<\/span><\/a> the Secretary-General back at 3am and accepted the job.<\/span><\/p>\n De Mistura initially tried a more bottom-up approach to peacemaking than his predecessors. He took an immediate risk in late 2014 when he proposed a series of \u2018freeze zones\u2019 or small, local freezes of violence in the iconic Syrian city of Aleppo. The theory was that the neighbourhood-level freezes could later be linked together and eventually replicated in other cities. While the envoy\u2019s advisors suggested that de Mistura pick a less difficult place, he<\/span> felt<\/span><\/a> strongly that Aleppo would have symbolic power in demonstrating \u2018drops of hope\u2019 and the need to protect civilians elsewhere. De Mistura also<\/span> hoped<\/span><\/a> that drawing public attention to Aleppo, which was close to collapse, might help prevent the regime or the opposition from escalating the fight.<\/span><\/p>\n When both the regime and the opposition ultimately eschewed the Aleppo initiative, Ban instructed de Mistura to try to organise political talks, shifting the envoy back to a more top-down approach to conflict resolution. De Mistura has tried to be more inclusive, acknowledging that the conflict is part of a larger regional contest and shifting geopolitical dynamics. To lay the groundwork for the current talks, he first held one-on-one consultations in Geneva with hundreds of leaders, groups and factions. Shortly thereafter, he logged over 25,000 miles of air travel in two weeks to meet with officials in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and China.<\/span><\/p>\n De Mistura\u2019s forward-leaning style, however, has at times landed him in hot water. The envoy\u2019s critics<\/span> note<\/span><\/a> that he can sometimes speak too soon and too much, resulting in hyperbole and diplomatic missteps. He offhandedly told reporters in early 2015 that Assad should be part of the solution, sparking intense criticism as it came the same day that the Syrian Government launched missiles and barrel bombs in the city of Douma. De Mistura<\/span> insists<\/span><\/a> he meant that Assad should be part of the solution for setting up the Aleppo freeze, not part of the solution to the overall Syrian conflict, but his comments further alienated the opposition. De Mistura\u2019s former political director<\/span> claims<\/span><\/a> that the envoy has at times lost credibility because he tends to tell his interlocutors what they want to hear, and think about the consequences later.<\/span><\/p>\n In his efforts to innovate where the status quo has failed, Mistura has relied heavily on small changes in terminology in an attempt to generate big results. He has tried to distinguish the current talks from the high-level summits of his predecessors by calling them the \u2018Geneva Intra-Syria talks\u2019 not \u2018Geneva III\u2019. His initial Aleppo plan was about \u2018freeze zones\u2019 not \u2018ceasefires\u2019, which had failed in the past. He referred to his consultations in Geneva as a \u2018stress test\u2019, not \u2018negotiations\u2019, and he prefers to speak of \u2018action plans\u2019, rather than \u2018peace plans\u2019. While those terminological nuances might make sense in theory, the media\u2019s disregard for them seems to render his effort ineffective.<\/span><\/p>\n As could be expected, de Mistura has come under fire from all sides. The opposition has accused him of favouring the regime, and he has angered the regime with critical public remarks on airstrikes. Political commentators have criticised him for failing to engage the opposition enough, falling victim to manipulation by the regime, and focusing on the political process at the expense of reducing violence against civilians. De Mistura\u2019s own former political director resigned in anger,<\/span> accusing<\/span><\/a> the envoy of cronyism and incompetence. However, one doesn\u2019t spend 40 years in the UN without developing a thick skin. De Mistura acted quickly to hire a new political director who specialises in constitutional law, and he redoubled his efforts to smooth over relations with opposition leaders. For the most part, he seems undeterred by his critics,<\/span> saying<\/span><\/a> that complaints are inevitable.<\/span><\/p>\n Looking ahead to when the proximity talks<\/span> resume<\/span><\/a> on 7 March, de Mistura\u2019s efforts may very well continue to sputter or stir up controversy, but it\u2019s hard to blame him for trying and there are still benefits to continuing the conversation. UN expert Richard Gowan<\/span> explains<\/span><\/a> that maintaining a negotiation process for the sake of it is sometimes an unglamorous necessity. Demonstrating both the value and the risk of talks, he<\/span> says<\/span><\/a>,<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018UN mediators have kept talks over other intractable conflicts, ranging from Cyprus to Somalia, going for years or decades. It is sometimes necessary to hold consultations to remind everyone that a diplomatic track is still available, although there is a risk that sustaining the process becomes an end in itself.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n