, namely, the way environmental factors interact with social, economic and security challenges.<\/span><\/p>\nThird, the White Paper argues that instability could have strategic consequences for Australia should it lead to \u2018increasing influence by actors from outside the region with interests inimical to ours\u2019 (2:35). Moreover, the White Paper states that Australia can\u2019t be secure if the Pacific Island countries become a source of threat to Australia in the form of a foreign military power seeking influence in ways that could \u2018challenge the security of our maritime approaches or transnational crime targeting Australian interests\u2019 (3:7)<\/span>.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\nAs Defence White Papers don\u2019t exist in a vacuum, how will the other government agencies engaged in the Pacific meet the challenges outlined above? The White Paper refers broadly to Australian assistance in the areas of national resilience, defence cooperation, aid, policing and building regional organisations as crucial to prevent instability.<\/span><\/p>\nIt drills down to specifics in the context of deepening its security partnerships, such as the Defence Cooperation Program, the cornerstone of which is the Pacific Maritime Security Program, and increased plans to strengthen military forces in PNG, Tonga and Fiji. Acknowledgement is also made of the need for cooperation with Pacific Island countries to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and security or stabilisation operations, such as those in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.<\/span><\/p>\nWhile there\u2019s little in this White Paper that differs from its predecessors, the language is more aggressive which matches the overall threat and balancing narrative of the White Paper . It identifies the potential for external actors to expand their influence in the region, including through enhanced security ties. This is a clear nod to the growing influence of China in the Pacific, and more recently Russia, which has raised the spectre of geopolitical tensions and the possibility Australia could lose its strategic advantage in the neighbourhood. The response is equally clear. Alongside strengthening the ability of Pacific Island countries to build their resilience to natural disasters and to manage internal, transnational and border security challenges (including natural resource protection), Australia will be working to limit the influence of any actor from outside the region with divergent interests.<\/span><\/p>\nSo does a more defence-oriented Australia mean a militarised Pacific? According to the White Paper, it will. This includes a more regular surface and airborne Australian maritime presence as a consequence of increased participation in multinational exercises;<\/span> enhanced maritime forces and amphibious capability resulting in greater responsiveness and flexibility; the more expansive Pacific Maritime Security Program which includes enhanced aerial surveillance and support for the regional security architecture; and greater coordination and burden-sharing with New Zealand, France, the US and Japan on maritime security and disaster relief. Underpinning that is a push to develop a shared maritime domain awareness across the Pacific.<\/span><\/p>\nGiven the tenor of this White Paper, its focus isn\u2019t surprising. Australia\u2019s right to be concerned about the strains on governance\u2014and government\u2014in some Pacific Island countries. It correctly highlights the ever-growing threat posed by transnational crime and the increasing likelihood of HADR operations. And yes, the geopolitics of the immediate neighbourhood have shifted and Australia\u2019s position as the principle security partner of Pacific Island nations isn\u2019t necessarily guaranteed. The question now is will Australia be able to strengthen its relationships with Pacific Island countries in order to reassert its position in the region and ensure its ongoing strategic objectives.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Australia\u2019s 2016 Defence White Paper states that it\u2019s second Strategic Defence Interest is \u2018a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific\u2019 (3:68), which includes Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the Pacific …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":320,"featured_media":24996,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[283,1614,1636,63,99],"class_list":["post-24993","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-climate-change","tag-cooperation","tag-defence-white-paper-2016","tag-hadr","tag-south-pacific"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
DWP 2016: Australia in the South Pacific | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n