{"id":25020,"date":"2016-03-01T15:20:25","date_gmt":"2016-03-01T04:20:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=25020"},"modified":"2016-03-01T16:12:55","modified_gmt":"2016-03-01T05:12:55","slug":"dwp-2016-the-return-of-geography","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/dwp-2016-the-return-of-geography\/","title":{"rendered":"DWP 2016: the return of geography"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"8539137367_e5f440218d_z\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper marks the return of geography to defence planning. Not that it had ever entirely disappeared, although Defence Minister Robert Hill at times tried his best to ridicule the importance of geography and persuade the Cabinet that the Middle East was of greater strategic importance than the defence of Australia. Prime Minister John Howard was fully alert to the domestic political dangers of such positions and promptly sent Hill off to be Australia\u2019s Permanent Representative to the United Nations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Australia’s unique strategic geography first came to prominence in the 1972 Australian Defence Review. That document was the precursor to the 1976 DWP, and identified geography as having \u2018a compelling influence on Australian security\u2019 and that Australia needed to be able to defend the continent \u2018if need be, alone\u2019. Self-reliance in situations of less than global or major international concern were stated to be \u2018a central feature in the future development of Australia\u2019s defence policy\u2019. These concepts were elaborated in the seminal 1976 White Paper which stated increased self-reliance to be a primary requirement. The \u201976 document observed the US alliance didn\u2019t free Australia from the responsibility to make adequate provision for its own security, or to help support stability and security in its own neighbourhood.<\/span><\/p>\n

These central defence planning concepts were elaborated in more or less detail, and with differing interpretations of our area of primary strategic concern, in the 1987, 1994 and 2000 efforts. The 2000 DWP developed concepts that were characterised by its critics as \u2018concentric circles\u2019 for defence planning. They identified our strategic objectives as the defence of Australia and its direct approaches; the security of our immediate neighbourhood; stability in Southeast Asia; the support of strategic stability in the wider Asia\u2013Pacific region; and global security, in that order.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Rudd government’s 2009 DWP focused on a similar ordering of strategic priorities. But it also usefully observed that this strategic geography hierarchy reflected Australia’s \u2018realistic capacity for influence through the employment of military power.\u2019 That\u2019s an important policy judgement. The fact remains that it\u2019s closer to home where we are able to do something decisive about military contingencies as \u2018no-one else would have as deep an interest in acting\u2019. The air-sea gap to our north was described as \u2018at the strategic centre of our primary operational environment\u2019 and the document outlined the need to maintain a strong capability to project military power utilising forward operating bases in northern Australia.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Turnbull government\u2019s DWP clearly recognises geographical strategic imperatives. It lists Australia’s strategic defence interests as:<\/span><\/p>\n