{"id":25079,"date":"2016-03-08T14:30:50","date_gmt":"2016-03-08T03:30:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=25079"},"modified":"2017-02-12T21:04:41","modified_gmt":"2017-02-12T10:04:41","slug":"reflections-on-the-2016-quad-plus-dialogue","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/reflections-on-the-2016-quad-plus-dialogue\/","title":{"rendered":"Reflections on the 2016 Quad Plus Dialogue"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Back in mid-February, we were in India for the 2016 Quad Plus Dialogue as guests of the<\/span> Vivekananda International Foundation<\/span><\/a>. This was the third event in a series that kicked off<\/span> in Canberra in 2013<\/span><\/a>. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners are Australia, India, Japan and the United States, and we also had representatives at this meeting from \u2018Plus\u2019 countries\u2014in this case Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Talks were held at the \u2018second track\u2019 level (i.e. academics and think tanks rather than government officials).<\/span><\/p>\n The idea of the Quad has been around for a decade, but hasn\u2019t been taken up at government level, despite <\/span>occasional spikes<\/a> of interest<\/a><\/span>. There\u2019s little doubt that Beijing wouldn\u2019t be thrilled that these talks are happening\u2014it has tended to see the Quad as a conspiracy against its interests. And China would doubtless take an even sourer view of the inclusion of a widening range of states.<\/span><\/p>\n But to no small extent, the Quad Plus is a collaboration of China\u2019s own making. To be sure, the Quad countries have a broad alignment of interests and share democratic ideals, but that doesn\u2019t make for a great agenda for a roomful<\/span> of security wonks. It\u2019d be hard to see how a Quad Plus meeting could be sustained if all was well in our world. This year\u2019s Quad Plus came at a time when events in the South China Sea provided an increasingly tense backdrop and it shouldn\u2019t surprise anyone that much of the discussion was about responses to Chinese assertiveness.<\/span><\/p>\n The ensuing conversations showed, we think, both the strength and weakness of the Quad formulation. The strength is that four quite diverse countries can sit around a table and have a pretty candid discussion of their security concerns and possible actions. The weakness is that those security concerns don\u2019t overlap quite as strongly as a first glance might suggest\u2014especially when it comes to the nitty-gritty of what we\u2019re willing to risk over particular issues. When it comes down to it, Australia, Japan and the US have a shared maritime security concern in the Western Pacific, while India\u2019s primary concern is on their extensive land border with China.<\/span><\/p>\n Actually, it\u2019s not quite as clear-cut as that; India also has maritime interests, sees itself as a growing naval power and has participated in naval exercises with the other Quad members<\/span>. And India is closely watching China\u2019s naval activities in the Indian Ocean. But ultimately, it\u2019s hard to see India risking blood and treasure for the sake of freedom of navigation in waters far to its east\u2014especially when that would likely raise the stakes on its northern border. Similarly, it\u2019s hard to see Australia, Japan or the US being enthused about a high-altitude land war on the\u00a0<\/span>disputed and complex China\u2013India border<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n The net result is that, at least as things stand, it\u2019s hard to see the Quad producing a coherent response to hard security issues. Each country will make its own judgement about how much it\u2019s willing to put on the line over any given issue, and about which issue is paramount. Even among Australia, Japan and the United States, the respective strengths of our interests in both the East and South China seas varies greatly. Adding \u2018Plus\u2019 countries to the mix only makes it harder still, as the cost-benefit calculus for militarily weaker nations is necessarily different again.<\/span><\/p>\n That\u2019s not to say that the Quad Plus Dialogue isn\u2019t useful, and it shouldn\u2019t be supposed that it was all about China. Transnational problems like terrorism, cybercrime and piracy are well worth talking about, and there was a fruitful dialogue on those topics. There\u2019s always going to be benefit from similarly disposed members of the international community talking straight about tough issues.<\/span><\/p>\n It remains to be seen whether the four Quad countries will ever convene regularly at an official level to caucus on security matters. It\u2019s been almost a decade since the informal<\/span> \u2018exploratory meeting\u2019 of officials from the four countries at the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila drew Beijing\u2019s ire<\/span><\/a> in 2007. In the absence of a catalyst, the four countries will probably remain content to liaise through their existing bilateral and trilateral channels. As with so much else about the regional response to China\u2019s rise, the fear of falling into a<\/span> security dilemma<\/span><\/a> dampens the prospects. If there\u2019s to be a catalyst, it will almost surely originate from China.<\/span><\/p>\n In the meantime, one way to engender cooperation would be set aside the Quad as a diplomatic initiative and instead work on expanding the existing tripartite<\/span> (India\u2013Japan\u2013US) Malabar naval exercise<\/span><\/a> to include Australia as a fourth permanent partner. To date<\/span> Australia has only participated once<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> back in 2007<\/span><\/a>. When all\u2019s said and done, naval cooperation wouldn\u2019t just be valuable in and of itself, but it would also send almost as strong a message of common purpose as any communiqu\u00e9 from a diplomatic meeting.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Back in mid-February, we were in India for the 2016 Quad Plus Dialogue as guests of the Vivekananda International Foundation. This was the third event in a series that kicked off in Canberra in 2013. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":25210,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[69,135,467,1435,31],"class_list":["post-25079","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-india","tag-japan","tag-multilateralism","tag-quadrilateral","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n