![\"Australian](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/03\/20141010army8517500_102.t5436f24e.m800.x2c932aa9.jpg\" "\\"Image")
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The release of<\/span> 2016 Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a> signifies a much sharper focus from Australia on maritime Southeast Asia. Geography dictates that whenever Canberra looks at maritime Southeast Asia, the first country that appears in its strategic outlook is Indonesia. Indeed, the 2016 DWP reiterates Indonesia\u2019s strategic importance to Australia as a \u2018near neighbour\u2019 (paragraph 2.81). While Indonesia\u2019s strategic importance is something that Australia seems obliged to acknowledge heavily in each iteration of the Defence White Paper, the feeling isn\u2019t always mutual. Indonesia\u2019s<\/span> 2008 DWP<\/span><\/a>, for instance, mentions Australia nine times whereas Australia\u2019s<\/span> 2009<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> 2013<\/span><\/a> DWPs mention Indonesia 21 and 32 times, respectively. The 2016 DWP is aware of this asymmetry. While the previous two Australian DWPs denote the relationship with Indonesia as Australia\u2019s \u2018most important\u2019 in the region, the 2016 DWP only regards it as \u2018vital\u2019, offering a more realistic and productive view of the relationship.<\/span><\/p>\n For instance, while the 2009 DWP considers the potential of \u2018an authoritarian or overly nationalistic regime in Jakarta\u2019 as creating \u2018strategic risks for its neighbours\u2019 (4.33), the 2016 DWP excluded such references, as if to convey a greater Australian confidence in Indonesia\u2019s potential as a reliable security partner.<\/span><\/p>\n Australia and Indonesia certainly share some common security interests that are discussed in the 2016 DWP, including \u2018the security and stability of the maritime domains that we share, the free movement of trade and investment through these domains, and countering terrorism and people smuggling in our region\u2019 (5.34). But those are only incidental intersections between different strategic outlooks, from which our respective strategic policies follow.<\/span><\/p>\n That raises a question about the extent to which Indonesia shares Canberra\u2019s unqualified strategic assessment of the United States as a \u2018stabilising force in the Indo\u2013Pacific\u2019 (2.80). While Indonesia certainly views the US\u2019 role in regional security and stability as indispensable, the maintenance of US primacy in the region isn\u2019t a <\/span>sine qua non<\/span><\/i>. Rather, Indonesia thinks that the region\u2019s security and stability is best guaranteed through collective commitments towards shared norms and institutions (embodied within ASEAN-centric architectures) in which all the major powers become their guarantors and are equally responsible for their preservation. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa\u2019s<\/span> \u2018dynamic equilibrium\u2019<\/span><\/a> concept reflects this sentiment in a way that still resonates within Indonesia\u2019s present strategic outlook. The differences between Australian and Indonesian strategic outlooks shouldn\u2019t be overstated, but they could become potential future stumbling blocks on the road toward a deeper strategic partnership.<\/span><\/p>\n The Australia\u2013Indonesia relationship often depends on how Australia regards its role in Southeast Asia. That\u2019s got nothing to do with the dichotomy between Australia\u2019s history and geography, as John Howard once<\/span> said<\/span><\/a>, but is more about Australia\u2019s ability and willingness<\/span> to operate as an autonomous actor in response to strategic challenges in the region. Often Indonesia (and others in the region) finds it hard to distinguish Australia\u2019s individual strategic policies from the policies that are implemented merely as demonstrations of Australian commitment to the US alliance, especially as the latter policies can be cloaked in the former. That\u2019s particularly pertinent in light of Australia\u2019s reactionary<\/span> assertiveness<\/span><\/a>, potentially through conducting military<\/span> freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs)<\/span><\/a>, against China\u2019s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n The 2016 DWP notes Australia\u2019s legitimate concerns about the militarisation and fortification of disputed features and waters in the South China Sea. Although the position is addressed to all claimants, China in particular is singled out, given the pace and scale of its reclamation activities relative to other parties. Indonesia is equally, if not more, alarmed as Australia is about China\u2019s excessive maritime claims. But the two countries may be driven by different motives when considering their responses to this challenge. Despite its self-proclaimed<\/span> non-claimant<\/span><\/a> status, Indonesia is increasingly worried about the potential implications of the disputes on the Natuna Islands, and anxious about the Sino\u2013American geostrategic brinkmanship in the region towards ASEAN\u2019s unity and centrality, in which Indonesia\u2019s credibility as a de facto <\/span>primus inter pares <\/span><\/i>is at stake. In contrast, Australia may think that challenging China due to its commitment towards the US alliance is as important as its own geostrategic and geoeconomic reasons.<\/span><\/p>\n Rather than simply acting out of the commitment to the US alliance, Australia\u2019s South China Sea policies that are promoted largely by its own national interests (such as the maintenance of UNCLOS-based maritime order)<\/span> could actually elicit greater appreciation from Indonesia and perhaps Southeast Asia. This would mean that Australia\u2019s efforts shouldn\u2019t only be about restraining China from imposing the 9-dash line, but also about mitigating the Sino\u2013American geostrategic contest in the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n Yet, the South China Sea could also become an arena where Australian and Indonesian strategic outlooks increasingly converge, and create a stimulus for a closer defence relationship. Indeed, with the 2016 DWP hailing \u2018Indonesia\u2019s increased focus on maritime affairs\u2019 and Australia\u2019s goal of seeking \u2018greater cooperation on maritime security activities that contribute to a stable and prosperous region\u2019 (5.34), the South China Sea could serve as a wake-up call for the two countries to consider more sophisticated maritime security<\/span> cooperation<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Australia is starting to recognise Indonesia\u2019s<\/span> military modernisation<\/span><\/a> and growing influence as \u2018positive developments\u2019 (2.83), which is a signal of Australia\u2019s willingness to ameliorate the seemingly ubiquitous<\/span> security dilemma<\/span><\/a> with Indonesia. However, it takes two to tango: Indonesia\u2019s next Defence White Paper could make positive reference to Australia\u2019s<\/span> military build-u<\/span>p<\/span><\/a> as a continuation of its commitment to improving bilateral defence cooperation.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The release of 2016 Defence White Paper signifies a much sharper focus from Australia on maritime Southeast Asia. Geography dictates that whenever Canberra looks at maritime Southeast Asia, the first country that appears in its …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":155,"featured_media":25264,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1614,1636,1522,8,471],"class_list":["post-25263","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-cooperation","tag-defence-white-paper-2016","tag-fonops","tag-indonesia","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n