{"id":25281,"date":"2016-03-10T15:20:00","date_gmt":"2016-03-10T04:20:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=25281"},"modified":"2016-03-10T11:03:16","modified_gmt":"2016-03-10T00:03:16","slug":"upping-the-ante-in-the-south-china-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/upping-the-ante-in-the-south-china-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"Upping the ante in the South China Sea?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"
\nThe US Navy\u2019s <\/span>USS John C. Stennis<\/span><\/i> carrier strike group has recently concluded a five-day \u2018<\/span>routine patrol<\/span><\/a>\u2019 in the South China Sea. Accompanied by several US vessels based in Japan, at first glance it appears that Admiral Harry Harris\u2019 congressional<\/span> testimony<\/span><\/a> two weeks ago was the opening bell in a new round of military responses to continued Chinese<\/span> provocations<\/span><\/a>. That perception is reinforced in light of Harris\u2019 call to resurrect Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe\u2019s 2007 proposal of a<\/span> four-democracy naval convention<\/span><\/a> to police the South China Sea and deter any who sought to \u2018bully smaller nations through intimidation and coercion\u2019. As great as China\u2019s<\/span> fear<\/span><\/a> of a military powerful Japan is, perhaps even worse from Beijing\u2019s perspective is the<\/span> inclu<\/span><\/a>sion of USS <\/span>Ashland<\/span><\/i> in the <\/span>Stennis<\/span><\/i> group. <\/span>Ashland<\/span><\/i> is an amphibious docking vessel with the capability to support an amphibious assault by a Marine landing team on, say, a small islet such as Fiery Cross Reef.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Obama Administration doesn\u2019t rattle sabres very well, however. In fact, US Secretary of State John Kerry\u2019s lone<\/span> attempt<\/span><\/a> at doing so failed miserably. It\u2019s also struggled to devise a workable response to China\u2019s aggressive expansionism in the SCS. Thus, although \u2018<\/span>Johnny Reb\u2019s<\/span><\/i>\u2019 arrival appears supremely well timed, it\u2019s far more likely that it was planned weeks earlier to deflect criticism and reassure allies and regional partners. As should\u2019ve been expected, China\u2019s foreign minister lost no time in<\/span> condemning<\/span><\/a> the US presence and concluding his remarks with a veiled threat that \u2018history will prove who is merely the guest and who is the host\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

As Australia\u2019s recently released Defence White Paper states, Australia\u2019s security depends in part on how China and the US resolve their disagreements. Therefore, it\u2019s well worth every Australian\u2019s time to consider just what the stakes are in the South China Sea. Although the White Paper dismisses the likelihood of an invasion of the Australian homeland, it emphatically doesn\u2019t claim that regional war is unlikely and is, contra Hugh White, not short on \u2018<\/span>credible analysis<\/span><\/a>\u2019 of the breadth of challenges facing the region today.<\/span><\/p>\n

Two facts underline this difference. First, all three of the White Paper\u2019s Strategic Defence Interests encompass facets of the ongoing territorial disputes in the SCS. The reality of interstate competition cannot be denied, nor can the possibility be ignored that competition could easily become conflict. Second, the vast majority of the acquisition program laid out in both the DWP and the Investment Strategy involve end-items required for success in a potential maritime conflict. Surveillance and combat aircraft, surface warships (especially the <\/span>Hobart<\/span><\/i>-class Air Warfare Destroyers), advanced submarines, and additional intelligence\/surveillance\/reconnaissance, cyber, and space-based enablers all facilitate execution of operations beyond the confines of Australia\u2019s land area. In other words, the DWP\u2019s analysis abandons any attempt at rose-coloured-glasses optimism and identifies a rising China as the paramount challenge to regional order and stability. The Chinese government, as expected, lost no time in<\/span> impugning<\/span><\/a> the Turnbull Government\u2019s motives.<\/span><\/p>\n

Domestic<\/span><\/a> critics<\/span><\/a> of ADF expansion claim a \u2018lack of debate\u2019 surrounds government\u2019s decision to dedicate so much money for defence. While more engagement with the tax-paying public to show them where they\u2019ll receive value for money is a good thing, sceptics are wrong to propose instead unilateral Australian disarmament, an act that would leave Australia economically vulnerable. The Chinese hard-liners, whose nationalist-expansionist imperative Premier Xi Xinping<\/span> embodie<\/span><\/a>s, would view Australian disarmament as an invitation to accelerate their push for domination. Lacking a military option, Australia would become a tributary nation to the 21st century Chinese empire.<\/span><\/p>\n

Far from being a set of \u2018<\/span>strategic handcuffs<\/span><\/a>,\u2019 ANZUS and a robust ADF protect Australia from Chinese aggression. In 1991 the Philippines<\/span> declined<\/span><\/a> to renew a basing rights agreement with the United States. In subsequent years the Philippines failed to invest in a replacement for the deterrent force lost when the last US forces left in 1994. Since 2013 Manila has seen a steady increase in the amount of Chinese activity in the Spratly Islands\u2014against which the Armed Force of the Philippines have no<\/span> effective<\/span><\/a> response. China gives no indication it will<\/span> heed the pending decision<\/span><\/a> by the UN\u2019s Permanent Court of Arbitration if, as expected, it rules in favour of the Philippines. So what then?<\/span><\/p>\n

Australia, like the US, has a fundamental stake in the survival of a rules-based international order by which sovereign states negotiate solutions to their differences. China\u2019s revisionist government has no incentive to moderate its aggression in the SCS without a credible threat of costs imposed by the US and the world community\u2014of which Australia is a critical part. Those costs could include military ones, and lest anyone believe that the<\/span> US would not put a <\/span>Nimitz<\/span><\/i>-class air craft carrier at risk<\/span><\/a> for a principle, they should know that military action in defence of \u2018freedom of the seas\u2019 is the most powerful continuity in US foreign policy. It resulted in America\u2019s first overseas military action, against the Barbary Pirates during Jefferson\u2019s presidency. It was the most important justification for war against Great Britain less than 10 years later, and was very nearly so again during the Civil War in 1862\u20131863. Imperial Germany\u2019s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 caused an immediate diplomatic break, followed by a declaration of war in April.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although Southeast Asia and Oceania are still a long way from having to choose between <\/span>pax Americana<\/span><\/i> and <\/span>pax Sinica<\/span><\/i>, further Chinese attempts to subvert freedom of navigation within the SCS, or a Chinese disavowal of a Permanent Court ruling against its territorial claims, will require a response (including a potential military option) unless Australians are willing to concede that a rules-based order is not, in fact, a core Australian strategic interest. If that\u2019s the case, then whoever forms a government following the next elections may need another White Paper.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The US Navy\u2019s USS John C. Stennis carrier strike group has recently concluded a five-day \u2018routine patrol\u2019 in the South China Sea. Accompanied by several US vessels based in Japan, at first glance it appears …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":477,"featured_media":25284,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,1636,471,31],"class_list":["post-25281","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-defence-white-paper-2016","tag-south-china-sea","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nUpping the ante in the South China Sea? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/upping-the-ante-in-the-south-china-sea\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Upping the ante in the South China Sea? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The US Navy\u2019s USS John C. 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