{"id":25496,"date":"2016-03-24T06:00:27","date_gmt":"2016-03-23T19:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=25496"},"modified":"2023-04-12T13:00:20","modified_gmt":"2023-04-12T03:00:20","slug":"seeing-the-dragon-on-our-doorstep-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/seeing-the-dragon-on-our-doorstep-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Seeing the dragon on our doorstep (part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"
China\u2019s growing<\/span> anti-surface warfare<\/span><\/a> (ASuW) capability is strengthening the PLA\u2019s ability to wage offshore active defence within the<\/span> Near and Middle<\/span><\/a> Seas bound by the first and second island chains respectively. As China projects naval power to the Far Seas, this A2\/AD envelope is certain to expand. In this eventuality, Australia\u2019s future fleet of the <\/span>Hobart<\/span><\/i> class Air Warfare Destroyers and the SEA 5000 Future Frigates will face a growing threat from high speed, long range antiship cruise missile (ASCM) systems and land based antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) systems. The trend towards China pushing out its A2\/AD perimeter is clear with investment into the<\/span> DF-26<\/span><\/a> antiship capable intermediate range ballistic missile system with double the range of the existing<\/span> DF-21D<\/span><\/a> ASBM, and the<\/span> YJ-18<\/span><\/a> (and<\/span> here<\/span><\/a>) long-range supersonic antiship cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, naval surface ships and aircraft.<\/span><\/p>\n China\u2019s naval surface combatant capabilities are also improving in leaps and bounds, with<\/span> modern frigates and destroyers<\/span><\/a> such as the Type 054 <\/span>Jiangkai<\/span><\/i> FFG, and the Type 52D <\/span>Luyang<\/span><\/i> III DDG replacing older \u2018green and brown water\u2019 ships, giving the PLA-N a much greater ability to undertake near and middle sea counter-intervention operations. The PLA-N\u2019s naval surface forces will be enhanced in coming years by the deployment of the<\/span> Type 055 guided missile cruiser<\/span><\/a>, (<\/span>here<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> here<\/span><\/a>) which the 2015 US Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress on<\/span> Chinese Military Power<\/span><\/a> refers to as being \u2018under construction\u2019, may displace up to<\/span> 12,000 tons<\/span><\/a>. \u00a0This is comparable to the US Navy\u2019s <\/span>Zumwalt<\/span><\/i> class vessels, and the Type 055 will carry anti-air, antiship and land-attack cruise missiles in up to<\/span> 128 vertical launch system cells<\/span><\/a>. That\u2019s more than the US Navy\u2019s <\/span>Ticonderoga<\/span><\/i> class Aegis Cruisers (122 cells), and considerably more than the<\/span> Hobart<\/span><\/i><\/a> class AWDs (48 cells). Chinese deployment of the YJ-18 ASCM on those vessels would make them a<\/span> powerful<\/span><\/a> new capability once they enter service as early as 2017.<\/span><\/p>\n The Type 055 is as much a political statement to the region as it is an operational capability. Such a large ship, with such a massive ASuW and AAW capability seems overkill for the South China Sea\u2014or even for that matter Taiwan scenarios, where land-based airpower and missile systems, and smaller naval vessels could easily neutralise regional opponents. The Type 055 cruiser, together with China\u2019s future<\/span> Type 095 SSGN<\/span><\/a> (also likely equipped with YJ-18), and China\u2019s nascent aircraft carrier force, however sends a strong message about China\u2019s naval intentions. Such capabilities are a potent political symbols of China\u2019s rise to great power status.<\/span><\/p>\n Under the newly stated Strategic Defence Objectives (3.10\u20133.32), the<\/span> 2016 Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a> correctly seeks to focus the ADF\u2019s strategic gaze north towards maritime Southeast Asia and the Indo\u2013Pacific. That\u2019s also where China\u2019s growing naval power will be to protect its vital strategic interests along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Of course, it\u2019s highly unlikely that Australia would confront China by itself in a crisis and the White Paper emphasizes the need to strengthen the US alliance (5.18\u20135.30) as well as build new defence relationships (Chapter 5). However, the US can\u2019t be everywhere all the time, particularly as the size of its naval forces<\/span> shrink<\/span><\/a> whilst its global operational commitments grow. Australia may have to take an increasing share of the burden against a more powerful PLA-N that seeks to assert a presence into the Far Seas of the Indian Ocean throughout the next decade and beyond.<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019ll be crucial that the ADF avoid coming into the lethal envelope of those Chinese combat capabilities, necessitating greater and more urgent consideration of acquiring long-range high speed ASCMs and more sophisticated naval air defence systems, together with networked long-range maritime surveillance capabilities. The White Paper mentions long-range strike weapons for the air combat fleet (4.44), and discusses land-based antiship missile systems (4.46), but there\u2019s no mention of long-range high speed antiship cruise missiles, either for the future submarines or naval surface forces. As noted recently in<\/span> The Strategist<\/span><\/i><\/a>, this represents a serious capability gap.<\/span><\/p>\n Furthermore, China\u2019s growing long-range naval capability reinforces the requirement for an effective broad area maritime system, which under the Defence White Paper, rests on a force of just 15 P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (by the late 2020s) and seven MQ-4C Triton long-range UAVs, together with ship-launched tactical UAVs and the MH-60R Seahawk(4.37-4.39). Although technologically sophisticated, such a force is limited by numbers and thus operational availability. The risk of losses of platforms in a crisis would see that surveillance network made more fragile. Therefore it would be wise to enhance the resilience of Australia\u2019s broad area maritime surveillance capability, and extend its reach far beyond the air-sea gap. The TASW\/IUSS approach is one facet of building that capability. As the Integrated Investment Program gathers momentum, the issue of pervasive and resilient maritime surveillance capabilities for maritime Southeast Asia, and the Indo\u2013Pacific will become far more significant. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In my previous post, I recommended Australia develop a networked Theatre ASW (TASW) capability\u2014including building its own Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)\u2014as an essential capability in the face of likely Chinese PLA-N operations in our …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":25498,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,1636,1228,290],"class_list":["post-25496","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-defence-white-paper-2016","tag-pla-n","tag-power-projection"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
\nIn my<\/span> previous post<\/span><\/a>, I recommended Australia develop a networked Theatre ASW (TASW) capability\u2014including building its own Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)\u2014as an essential capability in the face of likely Chinese PLA-N operations in our northern maritime approaches. The expansion of PLA-N submarine operations is but one dimension of the growing risk facing Australia from a rising China that will increasingly project power into Australia\u2019s neighbourhood.<\/span><\/p>\n