{"id":25774,"date":"2016-04-06T14:30:05","date_gmt":"2016-04-06T04:30:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=25774"},"modified":"2016-04-06T15:41:23","modified_gmt":"2016-04-06T05:41:23","slug":"when-is-rolling-submarine-production-not-continuous","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/when-is-rolling-submarine-production-not-continuous\/","title":{"rendered":"When is rolling submarine production not continuous?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Image<\/p>\n

The 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) announced that the Future Submarine will be delivered under a \u2018rolling acquisition program\u2019. Initially we assumed this meant that submarines would be produced continuously under the<\/span> same sort of scheme envisaged for surface combatants<\/span><\/a>. We weren\u2019t alone in drawing such a conclusion; we\u2019ve spoken with parliamentarians, defence journalists and industry people who\u2019ve done likewise. But it\u2019s since been pointed out to us that we may be incorrect, and on a close re-reading of the DWP we\u2019re now not so sure. The relevant passage in the DWP appears in para 4.28:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018To ensure no capability gap and the ability to progress development of a replacement submarine in the 2050s, the Government has decided to implement a rolling acquisition program for Australia\u2019s submarine fleet.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Note that there\u2019s no concrete commitment to replace the submarines in the 2050s, only to have the ability to do so. In doing so, the government appears to have left open the option of leaving a gap between the end of the construction of the first twelve boats and the commencement of their replacement. That wouldn’t necessarily be a bad thing. As we’ve previously pointed out in the context of surface vessels, continuous production for a smallish fleet makes for uneconomically short vessel lifetimes.<\/span><\/p>\n

But what about the use of the term \u2018rolling\u2019, surely that\u2019s an unambiguous commitment to a never ending production schedule? Well, not necessarily. The term used in the context of the surface combatant fleet in the DWP is \u2018continuous\u2019 rather than \u2018rolling\u2019. We presume that White Paper\u2019s authors intend the distinction to be meaningful rather than decorative. If so, the use of \u2018rolling\u2019 in this context is spectacularly misleading. As recently as 2013, here\u2019s how Defence defined the term in one of its<\/span> own publications<\/span><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018Rolling build program is the term used in this report to describe an ongoing shipbuilding project. This is where ships are built at a steady cadence\u2026 Unlike the start and stop nature of pre-defined build projects, these projects are set up to run for an indefinite period. Ideally, the project will be designed to build ships at a certain interval, for a certain life of type so that when the last ship is built, the first requires replacement.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Nonetheless, as best we can infer, the term \u2018rolling acquisition\u2019 leaves open the options of both continuous and non-continuous build programs, while allowing the DWP to make the following reassuring but ultimately vague claim (para 4.122):<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018A rolling program of acquiring submarines will provide long-term planning certainty for Australian industry, allowing those Australian companies involved in the submarine program to invest in the capabilities needed to support their involvement in the construction and sustainment activities.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

If the goal really is to provide \u2018certainty for Australian industry\u2019, the government should clarify exactly what it means by the term \u2018rolling acquisition\u2019. As explained below, the choice between a continuous and non-continuous program entails multi-billion dollar consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n

Building on our<\/span> 2012 analysis<\/span><\/a> of scheduling the submarine replacement, we\u2019ve been looking in detail at the transition of the Collins class to the Future Submarine, including the options of continuous and non-continuous build strategies. One of the critical factors is the production interval between new boats. According to the DWP, the Future Submarine program will deliver the new vessels between the \u2018early 2030s\u2019 and the \u2018late 2040s to 2050\u2019, which implies an average production interval of close to 18 months. Our detailed analysis will appear in the 2016 Defence Budget Brief along with an examination of the Future Frigate program. The key conclusions are as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n