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What\u2019s more important: your relationship with Turkey\u2014your NATO ally\u2014or the potential to make significant inroads against Daesh in Syria? That\u2019s the question Ankara is asking the Obama administration following a<\/span> spate of deadly terrorist attacks<\/span><\/a> in Turkey in recent months that have further inflamed tensions between the Turkish government and the Turkish Kurds. Despite<\/span> attempts by the US<\/span><\/a> to calm the waters, the answer may be one Turkish President Erdogan isn\u2019t going to like\u2014while Turkey remains an important strategic partner for the US, the US\u2019s cooperation with Kurdish forces in Syria is indispensable.<\/span><\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s interpretation of this dilemma is relatively black and white. For Turkey, the Democratic Union Party (PYD)\u2014the Kurd\u2019s main political force in Syria\u2014and its armed wing, the People\u2019s Protection Unit (YPG), are<\/span> terrorist organisations directly linked to Turkey\u2019s Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party<\/span><\/a> (PKK)\u2014which Turkey, the UK, US, EU and Australia all<\/span> consider a terrorist group<\/span><\/a>. Erdogan\u2019s government has made the destruction of the PKK a<\/span> priority<\/span><\/a> since hostilities between the two sides resumed following the<\/span> collapse of a two-year ceasefire<\/span><\/a> in June last year.<\/span><\/p>\n Added to that tension, Ankara<\/span> fears<\/span><\/a> Syrian Kurds are manipulating the violence in Syria to carve out territory for an autonomous region\u2014as<\/span> Iraqi Kurds succeeded in doing in northern Iraq<\/span><\/a>\u2014along the border with Turkey, and have<\/span> warned the YPG<\/span><\/a> not to cross west of the Euphrates. Those fears aren\u2019t unfounded, with the PYD<\/span> announcing the formation<\/span><\/a> of the Federal Democratic System of Rojava and Northern Syria on 17 March, a move that the US, the Syrian and Turkish governments\u2014as well as rival Kurdish groups\u2014have<\/span> unanimously condemned<\/span><\/a>. In a nutshell, from a Turkish perspective, any assistance to Kurdish forces on either side of the border equates to the support of terrorism against Turkey.<\/span><\/p>\n The US has taken a decidedly different approach to the issue of Kurdish forces. While acknowledging the PKK as a terrorist organisation and<\/span> calling upon the PKK to cease attacks against Turkish citizens<\/span><\/a>, the Obama administration<\/span> has been at pains<\/span><\/a> to distinguish the PYD from its Kurdish compatriots in Turkey. The Turkish government has been infuriated by this response, with Erdogan using a<\/span> recent visit to Washington<\/span><\/a> to call for the US to change its position on the PYD. <\/span><\/p>\n In an attempt to calm hostilities and direct attention back to Syria,<\/span> Washington has urged all parties to focus on the common threat of Daesh<\/span><\/a>, calling on Turkey to cease its cross-border artillery fire into Syria and warning the YPG not to \u2018take advantage of a confusing situation\u2019 and seize new territory on the Turkish border.<\/span><\/p>\n Regardless of Turkey\u2019s displeasure, the US has little choice but to persist with its support for the PYD. The Obama administration has<\/span> made it clear<\/span><\/a> that its primary goal in Syria is the destruction of Daesh and time is running out to make significant progress before Obama leaves office. While the US currently has<\/span> 50 special operations forces<\/span><\/a> advising and assisting local fighters in Syria, it appears unlikely they\u2019ll seek to increase their ground involvement in the near future. The US, therefore, must rely on Kurdish forces on the ground to drive back Daesh.<\/span><\/p>\n Successful campaigns<\/span><\/a> over the past four years have proven that Syrian Kurdish forces, like their counterparts in Iraq, are a reliable and organised strategic partner for the US. They\u2019ve filled the void left by Syrian government forces when they<\/span> moved towards Aleppo<\/span><\/a> in 2012, and<\/span> have effectively established self-rule<\/span><\/a> in three regions collectively known as Rojava in the country\u2019s northeast. With the assistance of<\/span> US-led airstrikes<\/span><\/a>, they\u2019re squeezing IS around its bastion in Raqqa and across the border in north-western Iraq, and are<\/span> expected<\/span><\/a> to move towards the Aleppo region, where the US is yet to play a significant role in countering Daesh.<\/span><\/p>\n While the PYD may not be the ideal US ally, there are no valid alternatives capable of achieving the US\u2019 desired results. The US can\u2019t support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s brutal and historically anti-Western regime, despite the dictator<\/span> solidifying his leadership position in recent months<\/span><\/a>. Other potential partners for the US are equally distasteful, such as Hezbollah, the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front (considered a direct terrorist threat to the US) and a handful of relatively moderate, but largely disorganised, Sunni groups.<\/span><\/p>\n Intertwined with this is the Russia factor. Moscow appears more than willing to take advantage of any US hesitancy to fully support the Kurds because of fears it\u2019ll further strain the US\u2013Turkey relationship. Putin knows that Kurds aren\u2019t pawns in the Syrian conflict, and will consider siding with whoever offers them the greatest security. Putin\u2019s already stepped up<\/span> Russia\u2019s support for the Kurds<\/span><\/a> in recent months. In perhaps a sign of things to come, the<\/span> PYD opened its first foreign office in Moscow<\/span><\/a> in February, with a ceremony attended by Russian foreign ministry officials.<\/span><\/p>\n To counteract this, the US needs to take Turkey out of considerations in Syria, and as it<\/span> successfully managed to do so in northern Iraq<\/span><\/a>, convince the Kurds to choose the West over Russia. While Ankara may continue to voice its displeasure and<\/span> carry out attacks against the YPG<\/span><\/a> in Syria, it won\u2019t change Obama\u2019s mind.<\/span><\/p>\n