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Australia and Japan are key actors in the Indo\u2013Pacific, integral to the region’s future security architecture and the prevalence of international law at sea. Australia’s location, democratic system, economy and military capabilities make the country important to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.<\/span><\/p>\n The Japanese leader’s narrative is based on the following legs: peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law (including arbitration under UNCLOS); interim agreements on resource management (embodied in the Japan\u2013Taiwan fisheries agreement); tighter links among ‘Maritime Democracies’ (chief among them Asia’s \u2018democratic security diamond\u2019, made up of Japan, the US, India and Australia); regional capacity building assistance (both Japan and Australia are helping the Philippines rearm); and the 1982 Falklands War as a reminder to revisionist powers that appeals to international law don\u2019t exclude an armed response to aggression. <\/span><\/p>\n Despite strengthening ties, cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra is threatened by a long-standing dispute over whaling. Both countries therefore need to make an effort to reach a decision on that issue which lays the foundation for closer defence and security relations between the two countries in an increasingly challenging strategic environment.<\/span><\/p>\n In 2014 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Tokyo’s special permits under her whaling program \u2018JARPA II, were not \u201cfor purposes of scientific research\u201d pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention\u2019. Tokyo reacted by announcing in October 2015 that it was excluding the International Court of Justice from future whaling disputes, stating that its jurisdiction \u2018does not apply to … any dispute arising out of, concerning, or relating to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of the sea\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n Tokyo\u2019s decision is of particular concern to Australia and other maritime democracies, plus Vietnam, because it contradicts Japan\u2019s support for the Philippines’ international arbitration suit against China. It runs directly counter to the view that international law, and more specifically international tribunals, provide a way forward when negotiations have failed to produce a solution to maritime disputes. <\/span><\/p>\n It also contradicts the emphasis on the rule of law in Japan’s 2015 White Paper on the Arctic. After all, the notion that endless negotiations are better, and that a decision by an international court is incompatible with a country’s sovereignty, sounds perilously close to Beijing’s assertions in rejecting compulsory arbitration under UNCLOS in the South China Sea. <\/span><\/p>\n The context and scope may be different than the Philippines\u2013China arbitration case, but too much is at stake for Tokyo to leave this flank open. Looking at the wider strategic picture in the maritime Asia\u2013Pacific, it\u2019s clear that Tokyo should be careful to act in accordance with international law and tribunals given its stance on other maritime disputes. Any actions contrary to this have the potential to damage relations with a key partners like Australia. <\/span><\/p>\n The same determination, pragmatism, and eagerness to invest political capital\u2014as displayed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in securing a successful end to long years of fisheries negotiations with Taiwan\u2014is now needed. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n That doesn\u2019t mean, however, that Australia should simply continue to push Japan to terminate whaling. Scientific evidence-based conservation concerns are legitimate, but ideally should go hand-in-hand with a pragmatic examination of the other side’s cultural determinants plus shared strategic interests.. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Australia and Japan must understand that they\u2019re condemned to finding a solution, unless they\u2019re prepared to leave in place an obstruction to enjoying deeper relations and to give ammunition to other parties that seek to subvert the international legal order. Any solution to the issue will involve not only both countries\u2019 governments, but also their civil societies, including relevant private industry and environmental organisations. <\/span><\/p>\n Both Japan and Australia share an interest in the South China Sea, as clear from their support for the Philippines’ military modernisation program. A pragmatic approach to whaling, with concessions by both sides, would remove an irritant and pave the way to greater cooperation at all levels, including more frequent joint naval and military drills and exchanges. Proposals for an \u2018Asian NATO\u2019 remain far-fetched, but as long as Canberra and Tokyo keep moving forward they will stay alive.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Australia and Japan are key actors in the Indo\u2013Pacific, integral to the region’s future security architecture and the prevalence of international law at sea. Australia’s location, democratic system, economy and military capabilities make the country …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":295,"featured_media":25970,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,1056,135,471],"class_list":["post-25967","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia","tag-bilateral-relations","tag-japan","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n