, Obama described the Saudis (as well as other US allies) as \u2018free riders\u2019 on American foreign policy. That sparked discussion not only about whether it is true (the Saudis purchase huge amounts of military hardware from the US), but also about whether it should have been said out loud. After all, in politics as in life, not everything a person believes needs to be shared publicly.<\/span><\/p>\nBut Obama did not stop there. In the same interview, he declared that Saudi Arabia needs to learn to \u2018share\u2019 the Middle East with its archrival Iran. And he has been openly critical of the Kingdom\u2019s treatment of women, arguing that \u2018a country cannot function in the modern world when it is repressing half of its population.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\nOverall, however, US officials remain meek in discussing Saudi Arabia. When they acknowledge \u2018differences\u2019 with Saudi Arabia concerning how and where to fight terrorism, they sound like they are describing a disagreement between Roosevelt and Churchill about where precisely the Allies should strike Nazi Germany.<\/span><\/p>\nIn fact, the differences are huge, and many are rooted in the Kingdom\u2019s internal attitudes and policies. Consider, for example, Saudi Arabia\u2019s approach to the Islamic State (ISIS) and, more broadly, to Sunni radicalism throughout the Arab world.<\/span><\/p>\nIt is often alleged that the Saudis export terrorism. They don\u2019t. But what they have done is encourage their own radicals\u2014a natural byproduct of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia\u2019s fundamentalist brand of Islam\u2014to commit their terrorist acts elsewhere. As the radicals leave, so does Saudi money, which funds their violent activities.<\/span><\/p>\nDuring President George W. Bush\u2019s administration, the US worked with the Saudis to track financial flows to radical groups and thus weaken such groups\u2019 operations throughout the region, including in western Iraq. Their efforts brought some results. In fact, instead of congratulating itself for the supposed success of the US troop surge in Iraq in 2007, perhaps the Bush administration should have been touting the impact of that funding-focused initiative.<\/span><\/p>\nUnfortunately, the effort to interdict financial flows from Saudi Arabia weakened substantially after 2011, when parts of North Africa and the Middle East became engulfed in the so-called Arab Spring (a moniker that surely will be replaced with something both less cheerful and more accurate). The chaos that ensued fueled the spread of radical Sunnism\u2014a trend to which Saudi inattentiveness surely contributed.<\/span><\/p>\nAnd Saudi Arabia is unlikely to start paying attention now, when it is facing a perfect storm of problems, beginning with rock-bottom oil prices. Then there is conflict over the royal succession process, with King Salman\u2019s effort to consolidate power in the hands of his aggressive and talented but not particularly popular 30-year-old son causing considerable upset within the extended royal family.<\/span><\/p>\nIraq poses another problem for the Kingdom, as it sets an example of Shia consolidating political power. That example, the Saudis fear, could sustain political unrest in the Kingdom\u2019s Shia-majority Eastern Province, where most of the country\u2019s oil production is based. If Iraq\u2019s government deepens ties with Iran, the risk to stability could be heightened further.<\/span><\/p>\nFor Saudi Arabia, these challenges are a higher priority than defeating ISIS, which accounts for the country\u2019s virtual disappearance from the fight. Indeed, while many Saudis (not necessarily the elites) view ISIS as a barbaric movement with the potential eventually to harm their own country, they are willing, for the time being, to allow ISIS to continue its violent campaign. After all, for all the horrors seen in Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino, the victims of ISIS have been, by and large, Shia.<\/span><\/p>\nNow that the US has \u2018cleared the air\u2019 with the Saudis, the real work must begin. That means engaging in an honest conversation about the bilateral relationship, based on some acknowledgment of Wahhabism\u2019s central role in the rise of Sunni radicalism throughout the region.<\/span><\/p>\nSaudi Arabia can no longer be allowed to shift the blame\u2014for example, to Iraq\u2019s Shia-led government, for failing to reach out to the Sunni community. It is the responsibility of all Saudis\u2014and not just the royal family\u2014to work harder to tamp down radicalism within their country\u2019s borders and beyond.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"US President Barack Obama supposedly \u2018cleared the air\u2019 with Saudi King Salman before the latest meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia\u2019s capital. Given how strained the bilateral relationship is\u2014a situation long …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":507,"featured_media":26247,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[176,1078,31,1077],"class_list":["post-26243","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-barack-obama","tag-saudi-arabia","tag-united-states","tag-wahhabi"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
The Kingdom and the power | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n