{"id":26352,"date":"2016-05-03T14:30:53","date_gmt":"2016-05-03T04:30:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=26352"},"modified":"2016-05-03T15:20:53","modified_gmt":"2016-05-03T05:20:53","slug":"sea-1000-no-veto-for-beijing-on-australias-defence-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-1000-no-veto-for-beijing-on-australias-defence-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"SEA 1000: no veto for Beijing on Australia\u2019s defence policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"With the outcome of the long-awaited SEA 1000 Competitive Evaluation Process seeing France\u2019s DCNS announced as the international design partner for the future submarines, Australia must now manage the diplomatic fallout with the two failed bidders: Germany and, especially, Japan. As<\/span> David Lang<\/span><\/a> notes, \u2018we should expect the CEP outcome to dampen the energy and enthusiasm that\u2019s driven the bilateral relationship for much of the past two and a half years.\u2019 There may also be disappointment in key defence circles within the US, given the very<\/span> real strategic benefits<\/span><\/a> that would\u2019ve flowed to the Australia\u2013Japan\u2013US trilateral. But Japan\u2019s lost bid isn\u2019t simply a bilateral challenge for Australia\u2013Japan defence and foreign relations. Australia has to manage China\u2019s reaction.<\/span><\/p>\n

The outcome is likely to have<\/span> pleased Beijing<\/span><\/a>, (and<\/span> here<\/span><\/a>) given that<\/span> \u2018Option J\u2019<\/span><\/a> would have opened the doors to a greatly expanded strategic partnership between Tokyo and Canberra\u2014both allied to the US.<\/span> Paul Dibb<\/span><\/a> summed up the situation:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018Beijing must be rubbing its hands with glee that we are not buying submarines from its adversary, Japan\u2026there is every possibility that the harsh authoritarian leadership under President Xi Jinping considers it has successfully bullied Australia to kowtow to its demands.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It\u2019s ironic that despite China\u2019s probable happiness at Japan\u2019s loss, Australia\u2019s ability to operate alongside the US and Japan to counter Chinese naval forces will increase with this decision\u2014albeit<\/span> far too slowly<\/span><\/a> in a rapidly changing security environment. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, in managing strategic policy, perceptions really matter. It\u2019s unconvincing to suggest that the Turnbull government has chosen \u2018Shortfin Barracudas\u2019 over \u2018enhanced Soryus<\/span>\u2019<\/span><\/i> in part because of a fear of<\/span> angering Beijing<\/span><\/a>, but Australia can\u2019t allow the perception that Beijing has a veto over Australian defence and foreign policy gather strength. The best way to burst Beijing\u2019s prospective bubble in this issue is to move decisively to repair any damage with Tokyo through visible and concrete policy measures that strengthen the \u2018special strategic partnership\u2019. That\u2019s vital, given<\/span> increasing uncertainty<\/span><\/a> over the US role in Asia (let alone under a possible future<\/span> Trump Administration<\/span><\/a>), and China\u2019s more<\/span> assertive posture<\/span><\/a> in the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this worsening strategic environment, the old motto \u2018united we stand, divided we fall\u2019 is more relevant than ever. Failing to follow up the CEP outcome with new approaches to Japan for fear of<\/span> entrapment<\/span><\/a> would incentivise greater Chinese assertiveness at the expense of its neighbours\u2014America as well as Australia. A policy of deterrence and dissuasion, matched by constructive engagement, is the best approach to take with regards to China, and closer defence relations between Japan and Australia should be a cornerstone to that.<\/span><\/p>\n

To do this, Australia must develop closer cooperation with Japan (alongside the US) on ensuring<\/span> Freedom of Navigation<\/span><\/a> through joint Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. It can pursue cooperation alongside Japan in<\/span> capacity building<\/span><\/a> for security partners in the South China Sea that are facing a challenge from China\u2014such as the Philippines and potentially Vietnam\u2014through strengthening maritime domain awareness and ensuring sea lane security. The development of a<\/span> Theatre ASW<\/span><\/a> capability between Japan, Australia and the US would strengthen our ASW advantage over China\u2019s submarine fleet. Dialogue on<\/span> Ballistic Missile Defence<\/span><\/a> could contribute to countering China\u2019s increasing anti-ship ballistic missile and land-strike capability.<\/span><\/p>\n

Australia should also seek defence cooperation with Japan in operations and sustainment of the<\/span> F-35<\/span><\/a>, and in particular through provision of access to the Woomera Test Range in South Australia for combined training with the Japanese Air Self Defense Force. Beyond the F-35, Japan is developing its<\/span> X-2<\/span><\/a> stealth demonstrator for the future<\/span> F-3<\/span><\/a> stealth fighter program that could support a future bid to replace the RAAF F\/A-18Fs in the 2030s.<\/span><\/p>\n

In space,<\/span> networked commercial satellites<\/span><\/a> owned by Japan and Australia can contribute towards<\/span> information sharing<\/span><\/a> across common C4ISR networks. In the face of growing<\/span> PLA information warfare capabilities<\/span><\/a>, Japan, Australia and the US should seek to work collaboratively to build resilience in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Trilateral cooperation in pursuing technologies related to the<\/span> \u2018Third Offset\u2019<\/span><\/a> strategy led by the US could bring in many of these capability areas in a way that would more than address any gaps in the Australia-Japan relationship left by the submarine decision.<\/span><\/p>\n

China will clearly react negatively to such cooperation, or indeed to other opportunities that Canberra and Tokyo choose to pursue. Australia must resist the temptation of submitting to such threats, particularly as competition between China and the US intensifies. Instead, Australia should move decisively to reinforce defence ties with Tokyo in a manner that emphasises a strong and enduring strategic partnership for the future.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

With the outcome of the long-awaited SEA 1000 Competitive Evaluation Process seeing France\u2019s DCNS announced as the international design partner for the future submarines, Australia must now manage the diplomatic fallout with the two failed …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":26368,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,1051,135,1276,1203],"class_list":["post-26352","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-future-submarine-project","tag-japan","tag-japan-self-defense-forces","tag-sea-1000"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nSEA 1000: no veto for Beijing on Australia\u2019s defence policy | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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