{"id":26468,"date":"2016-05-09T06:00:03","date_gmt":"2016-05-08T20:00:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=26468"},"modified":"2016-05-09T09:18:18","modified_gmt":"2016-05-08T23:18:18","slug":"oz-media-and-the-wrong-lessons-of-afghanistan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/oz-media-and-the-wrong-lessons-of-afghanistan\/","title":{"rendered":"Oz media and the wrong lessons of Afghanistan"},"content":{"rendered":"
On 6 September, 2001, a bunch of journalists and military officers met at the National Press Club in Canberra to discuss why the military and media don\u2019t get along.<\/span><\/p>\n The Australian Defence Force had media problems and wanted to talk to hacks.<\/span><\/p>\n The meeting launched \u2018an ad hoc working group discussing military-media relations during ADF operations.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n We hacks assembled under the umbrella of the C.E.W. Bean Foundation. The military were from Defence Public Relations.<\/span><\/p>\n The media shambles of East Timor in 1999 was a wakeup call for Defence. Hacks had turned up in Dili from all over the world. Suddenly Defence discovered it didn\u2019t have a system for Oz journos, much less all the other hacks.<\/span><\/p>\n The 6 September minutes summarised the hack view:<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018There were lessons learned by the media during the East Timor operation, with only limited access available to ADF assets. Arrangements were ad hoc at best and often badly organised.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n The Defence response:<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018Defence acknowledges that it is at a cross roads in its operational relationship with media. Defence also acknowledges that its existing policies as applied during East Timor are in need of overhaul with many lessons being learnt… Defence acknowledges that it has not embedded media arrangements into its current operational doctrine with existing policy dating back to the late 1980s.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Defence promised \u2018a major overhaul of its operational arrangements for working with media\u2019 within 12 months, covering:<\/span><\/p>\n Fifteen years later, it\u2019s still a useful \u2018to do\u2019 list.<\/span><\/p>\n The working group laboured for a year. Good people in Defence pushed. The hacks leaned in. Big events overwhelmed the effort.<\/span><\/p>\n Five days after that first meeting at the Press Club, the planes hit the towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington.<\/span><\/p>\n The terrorism decade dawned.<\/span><\/p>\n Afghanistan happened and then Iraq. What didn\u2019t happen was a rethink of the way Defence deals with media.<\/span><\/p>\n Instead, the control on ADF information out of Afghanistan was \u2018draconian\u2019. Those controls were imposed and policed from Canberra by Defence and the Minister\u2019s office.<\/span><\/p>\n The \u2018draconian\u2019 view is from an ADF commander in the Middle East. The quote is in this column describing Defence media policy as<\/span> shut \u2018em up or shut \u2018em out.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n The stated reasons for secrecy and control are to protect lives and operations. The unstated reasons are political advantage, embarrassment protection and a diet of government-approved messages.<\/span><\/p>\n Come down the chain of command to get the Afghanistan perspective of Andrew Bird, who served as a media adviser and left the Army after eight years with the rank of Major. Bird told<\/span> The Age<\/span><\/i><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018The way that we communicated is all government-centric. It just relayed the Minister\u2019s and Prime Minister\u2019s message, reinforcing the government\u2019s message. Every image we took, every interview we did and every bit of vision \u2026 was to support the government\u2019s view.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Australians weren\u2019t told what their troops experienced. Former Chief of Army,<\/span> Peter Leahy<\/span><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018Apart from occasional glimpses of their work, centred around big battles and visiting politicians, we didn’t see much of what the Diggers were doing. Along with Iraq, Afghanistan must be one of the most little reported wars in Australia’s military history. The military, the government and the media can share the blame. They might argue over who was most at fault, but the end result is that a substantial slab of the Australian Army’s history has not been told.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n In response,<\/span> Thom Cookes<\/span><\/a> wrote it was disingenuous to lament Afghanistan\u2019s untold story when the ADF kept journalists away:<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018The ADF’s public relations bureaucracy is so risk averse that getting even the most basic information on what was happening in Afghanistan often proved to be impossible. Simply confirming information we already knew either took months, or was deemed to be a “breach of operational security”. Many of the most enterprising Australian journalists went straight to the Dutch and US forces, who were far more candid and confident in their dealings with the media.\u2019<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n While the \u2018ad hoc\u2019 talking started in 2001, it wasn\u2019t until 2009 that the ADF even trialled a journalist embed system in Afghanistan.<\/span><\/p>\n In a study of the ADF\u2019s approach to embedding journalists\u2014aptly titled<\/span> \u2018Herding Cats\u2019<\/span><\/a>\u2014Lieutenant Colonel Jason Logue commented that the Australian deployment to Afghanistan in 2001 and in the Middle East from 2003 \u2018highlighted the ADF\u2019s lack of capacity and intent to effectively support the media in areas of operation that were far from home.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n Reflecting on Army service in Afghanistan,<\/span> James Brown<\/span><\/a> wrote that a vacuum of information and understanding was created by a Defence culture unwilling to engage with the media and a political culture obsessed with controlling the media cycle.<\/span><\/p>\n\n